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The threat of malicious network attacks has become significant ever since net-
working became pervasive in our life. When adversaries have enough control over
the network measurements and control procedures, the effect of attacks can be as
detrimental as the breakdown of the whole network operations. This dissertation
studies possible adversarial effects under certain protection strategy, the condi-
tions under which attacks can be detected, and protection strategies to render
attacks detectable. Specifically, attacks on two types of networks are considered:
communications networks and power networks.
First, we consider an attack on communications networks, where a pair of nodes
are suspected to belong to the chain of compromised nodes used by the adversary.
If the pair belongs to the compromised chain, it forwards attack packets along the
chain, and thus there should exist an information flow between the pair. Detection
of an information flow based on node transmission timings is formulated as a binary
composite hypothesis testing. An unsupervised and nonparametric detector with
linear complexity is proposed and tested with real-world TCP traces and MSN
VoIP traces. The detector is proved to be consistent for a class of nonhomogeneous
Poisson processes.
Secondly, the topology attack on power networks is studied. In a so-called man-
in-the-middle topology attack, an adversary alters data from certain meters and
network switches to mislead the control center with an incorrect network topology
while avoiding detection by the control center. A necessary and sufficient condition
for the existence of an undetectable attack is obtained, and countermeasures to
prevent undetectable attacks are presented. It is shown that any topology attack
is detectable if a set of meters satisfying a certain branch covering property are
protected from adversarial data modification. The proposed attacks are tested with
IEEE 14-bus and IEEE 118-bus system, and their effect on real-time locational
marginal pricing is examined.
Lastly, a new attack mechanism aimed at misleading the power system control
center about the source of data attacks is proposed. As a man-in-the-middle state
attack, a data framing attack is proposed to exploit the bad data detection and
identification mechanisms at the control center. In particular, the proposed attack
frames normal meters as sources of bad data and causes the control center to re-
move useful measurements from the framed meters. The optimal design of data
framing attack is formulated as a quadratically constrained quadratic program
(QCQP). It is shown that the proposed attack is capable of perturbing the power
system state estimate by an arbitrary degree using only half of the critical mea-
surements. Implications of this attack on power system operations are discussed,
and the attack performance is evaluated using benchmark systems.
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1.1 Motivation and Overview
Since the advent of computer networks, networks among people and devices have
grown rapidly in their sizes and capabilities. Nowadays, the majority of people
are connected to cellular or computer networks most of time, and our reliance
on communications networks has never been more tremendous. In addition to
communications networks, power networks assume an extremely crucial role in
supporting our daily life: power networks enable reliable delivery of electricity to
our homes, work places, and physical infrastructures.
For proper operations, a network has to be protected from possible attacks. As
the role of networks became important, potential effects of network attacks also
became significant. For instance, an adversary in a data network may hack into a
server to attain unauthorized data thereby possibly causing privacy data leakage.
In power networks, its cyber-physical nature allows an adversary to create even
worse consequences. For instance, an adversary may alter meter data to mislead
the control center about the current operating condition. Such an attack may
possibly leads to breakdown of power plants, electricity price perturbation, and
even a blackout in the worst case. Such attacks on networks have been continuously
reported thereby proving the presence of threats.
Fortunately, many attacks leave traces in the network measurements (e.g., net-
work log files, measurements from deployed sensors.) However, it is nontrivial how
to detect presence of an attack based on the measurements. Smart adversaries will
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attempt to hide their traces, and it is indeed possible if they have enough controls
on the network or the measurements. Furthermore, sometimes, an attack may
not leave a strong signature in the network measurements. Therefore, a detection
algorithm needs to be carefully designed, and the fundamental limitation due to a
strong adversary needs to be studied. This dissertation studies protection strate-
gies to render attacks detectable and conditions under which a smart adversary
can launch an attack without leaving any detectable trace.
We first consider an attack on communications networks in Chapter 2. We
consider the so-called stepping stone attack [1], in which the attacker uses a chain
of compromised nodes to access the victim. This strategy is often used to confuse
the intrusion detection system about the adversary’s location. If the adversary
compromises a pair of supposedly independent nodes and use them as stepping
stones to the victim, there should exist information flows (associated with the
attack) between the pair. Given suspect nodes for stepping stones, detection of
information flows can be applied to trace back the stepping stone chain. We
formulate the problem as a binary composite hypothesis testing and present an
unsupervised and nonparametric detection algorithm.
Then, we move to attacks on power networks in Chapter 3. In a power network,
the control center periodically collects measurements from meters and sensors de-
ployed throughout the network. These measurements are used in estimating the
real-time system state and the network topology. We study a specific type of data
attack that alters part of the measurements to mislead the control center with an
incorrect network topology. Such attacks may cause the control center to believe
in false contingency information or delay preventive actions when important trans-
mission lines are tripped. Unless the adversary can control a sufficient number of
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measurements, an attempt to disturb the topology estimate causes inconsistency
among the measurements, and this anomaly can be well detected by the legacy
bad data test. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which an
attack can be successful without causing any detectable anomaly and present con-
struction of undetectable attacks. Then, the necessary and sufficient condition is
used to develop a graph-theoretical meter protection strategy.
In Chapter 4, a data framing attack on power system state estimation is pre-
sented. The framing attack is a new approach of data attack on state estimation
which misleads the control center that certain normally operating meters are re-
sponsible for generating biased measurements. The bad data identification rule
falsely identifies the data from these meters as bad and remove them from system
state estimation. Such an attack may degrade the accuracy of state estimation
and even make the network vulnerable to arbitrary perturbation of the state esti-
mate. We formulate the optimal design of the framing attack as a quadratically
constrained quadratic program and show that the framing attack needs to alter
only half of the critical set of measurements to perturb the state estimate by an
arbitrary degree. The proposed attack is evaluated with the IEEE 14-bus and
118-bus networks.
The following three sections give more details about related works and our
contributions in the aforementioned three topics.
1.2 Detection of Information Flows
Detection of information flows between a pair of nodes has been studied in the
context of network intrusion detection, especially in the detection of interactive
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stepping-stone attacks [1]. The use of only transmission timing measurements for
detection is motivated by the fact that packets involved in an attack can be easily
encrypted. Even though transmission timings of nodes can be easily monitored,
detecting information flows based on timing is non-trivial. One main source of
difficulty is the presence of noise-like epochs. When an information flow exists
between the two nodes, the two nodes may have transmissions that do not belong
to the flow. They may multiplex transmissions of other flows that go through only
one of the two nodes, or intentionally superpose dummy transmissions to avoid
detection. We refer to such transmissions as chaff transmissions.
1.2.1 Related Works
Donoho et al. [1] were among the first to consider the flow model with a uniform
delay bound. Following their model, many algorithms have been proposed to
detect a flow with a delay constraint. As an active detection scheme, Wang et
al. [2] proposed a watermark-based detector which embeds watermarks by slightly
adjusting transmission timings of a node; if the same watermarks are detected in
another node, two nodes are claimed to have flows between them. Their work was
followed by a large number of watermark-based detectors [3–10]. The insertion
of watermarks, however, requires the ability of the detector to modify traffic at
different locations of the network, which may not be possible in practical situations.
If the network traffic cannot be modified to facilitate detection, the problem is
referred to as passive flow detection, and it is the problem of our interest. In pas-
sive detection, a detector collects transmission timing measurements and analyzes
them to draw a conclusion about presence of a flow. Many research efforts have
been made to develop effective passive detectors. Zhang et al. [11, 12] proposed
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matching-based algorithms. However, they assumed that only one of two nodes
can insert chaff transmissions, and their algorithms are vulnerable to chaff inser-
tion at both nodes. Donoho et al. [1] proposed a wavelet analysis with a claim that
it can detect a flow in chaff if the chaff part is independent of the flow part and
the sample size is sufficiently large. Blum et al. [13] presented a counting-based
method which was shown to be able to detect a flow in chaff if the fraction of
chaff is small enough. Under the Poisson traffic assumption, they characterized
the sufficient sample size for satisfying a given false alarm probability constraint.
However, their method may result in high miss detection probability if chaff trans-
missions are bursty. He and Tong [14] proposed a matching-based detector with
better chaff tolerance and characterized the maximum tolerable fraction of chaff
under the homogeneous Poisson traffic assumption. Their approach requires choos-
ing a detection threshold which is a function of the parameter of the underlying
Poisson traffic. When the traffic deviates from the Possion model, the detection
algorithm is not always robust. The approach in [14] can be applied to the general
traffic if a training data with a sufficiently long time span is available. Coskun and
Memon [15, 16] presented detectors based on random projection of transmission
processes. Similar to [14], their methods also require choosing an appropriate de-
tection threshold, which can be successful only if a large volume of training data
or an accurate parametric model is available.
1.2.2 Contributions
Our results include three parts: a nonparametric passive detection algorithm for
unidirectional or bidirectional flows, the related performance analysis, and exper-
iments with synthetic and real data. In developing an algorithm, our main contri-
5
bution is a new nonparametric technique that does not rely on knowledge of traffic
distribution; nor does it require a training data for either hypothesis. The key idea
lies in a particular transformation of the measurements that leads to distinct sta-
tistical behaviors under two different hypotheses. The proposed detector does not
assume stationarity of traffic and hence is applicable in time-varying traffic condi-
tions. Furthermore, it is memory-efficient and has linear computational complexity
with respect to the sample size thereby making real-time inference feasible.
In algorithm analysis, we aim to give theoretical justifications for the proposed
approach. To this end, we establish the consistency property of the proposed
detector for a class of non-homogeneous Poisson traffic. Even though the detector is
analyzed only for non-homogeneous Poisson traffic, the intuition behind it suggests
that it may perform well on the traffic with more general distribution.
The performance of our detector is evaluated using synthetic Poisson traffic,
LBL TCP traces [17], and real-world measurements from MSN VoIP sessions, and
comparison with other passive detectors is provided. The use of synthetic data
allows us to examine the trade-offs between miss detection and false alarm prob-
abilities using Monte Carlo simulations. LBL TCP traces and MSN VoIP traces
are of course not guaranteed to satisfy the assumptions made in our algorithm
analysis, and our results indicate a level of robustness.
1.3 Topology Attack of a Power Grid
Liu, Ning, and Reiter [18] appear to be the first to introduce the concept of data
injection attack (also referred to as malicious data attack) of a power grid. As-
suming that the attacker is capable of altering data from a set of meters, a similar
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scenario assumed in our problem setting, the authors of [18] show that if the set
of compromised meters satisfies certain condition, the adversary can perturb the
network state by an arbitrarily large amount without being detected by any detec-
tor. In other words, the data attack considered in [18] is undetectable. The main
difference between [18] and our work is that the attacks considered in [18] perturb
only the network state, not the network topology. It is thus most appropriate to
refer to attacks in [18] and many follow-ups as state attack, in distinguishing the
topology attack considered in our work.
1.3.1 Related Works
The work in [18] is influential; it has inspired many further developments, e.g.,
[19–22] and references therein, all focusing on state attacks. A key observation
is made by Kosut et al. in [23, 24], showing that the condition of non-existence
of an undetectable attack is equivalent to that of network observability [25, 26].
This observation leads to graph theoretic techniques that characterize network
vulnerability [24]. The condition to be presented in Chapter 3 on the non-existence
of an undetectable topology attack mirrors the state attack counterpart in [24].
The problem of adding protection on a set of meters to prevent undetectable
state attacks was considered by Bobba et al. [19]. We consider the same problem in
the context of topology attack. While meter protection problem for state attacks
is equivalent to protecting a sufficient number of meters to ensure observability
[19,24], the corresponding problem for topology attacks is somewhat different and
more challenging.
The problem of detecting topology error from meter data is in fact a classical
7
problem, casted as part of the bad data detection problem [27–29]. Monticelli [30]
pioneers the so-called generalized state estimation approach where, once the state
estimate fails the bad data test, modifications of topology that best represent the
meter data are considered. Abur et al. [31] extend this idea to the least absolute
value state estimation formulation, and Mili et al. [32] apply the idea to the state
estimation with the Huber M-estimator. Extensive works followed to improve
computational efficiency, estimation accuracy, and convergence property over the
aforementioned methods (e.g., see [33–35] and references therein).
Finally, there is a limited discussion on the impact of a malicious data attack on
power system operations. Should state estimates be used in closed-loop control of
the power grid, such an attack may cause serious stability problems. The current
state of the art, however, uses state estimates for real-time dispatch only in a
limited fashion. However, state estimates are used extensively in calculating real-
time locational marginal price (LMP) [36]. Thus, attacks that affect state estimates
will affect the real-time LMP calculation [37–39]. The way that a topology attack
affects LMP is significantly different from that of a state attack. We demonstrate
that a topology attack has significant impact on real-time LMP.
1.3.2 Contributions
First, we characterize conditions under which undetectable attacks are possible,
given a set of vulnerable meters that may be controlled by an adversary. To this
end, we consider two attack regimes based on the information set available to the
attacker. The more information the attacker has, the stronger its ability to launch
a sophisticated attack that is hard to detect.
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The global information regime is where the attacker can observe all meter and
network data before altering the adversary-controlled part of them. Although it
is unlikely in practice that an adversary is able to operate in such a regime, in
analyzing the impact of attacks, it is typical to consider the worst case by granting
the adversary additional power. We present a necessary and sufficient algebraic
condition under which, given a set of adversary controlled meters, there exists an
undetectable attack that misleads the control center with an incorrect “target”
topology. This algebraic condition provides not only numerical ways to check if
the grid is vulnerable to undetectable attacks but also insights into which meters to
protect to defend against topology attacks. We also provide specific constructions
of attacks and show certain optimality of the proposed attacks.
A more practically significant situation is the local information regime where
the attacker has only local information from those meters it has gained control.
We present that under certain conditions, undetectable attacks exist and can be
implemented easily based on simple heuristics.
Secondly, we study conditions under which any topology attack can be made
detectable. Such a condition, even if it may not be the tightest, provides insights
into defense mechanisms against topology attacks. We show that if a set of meters
satisfying a certain branch covering property are protected, then topology attacks
can always be detected.
1.4 Framing Attack on State Estimation
In power system state estimation, it is well known that bad data identification
rules may mistakenly identify good data entries as bad and remove them [40, 41].
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We study how such an inherent weakness of the bad data test can be exploited by
adversaries.
1.4.1 Related Works
We consider a man-in-the-middle attack, where an adversary can alter part of meter
measurements such that the control center is misled with the partially corrupt
measurements.
In [18], Liu, Ning, and Reiter presented perhaps the first man-in-the-middle
(MiM) attack on the power system state estimation where an adversary replaces
“normal” sensor data with “malicious data.” It was shown that, if the adversary
could gain control of a sufficient number of meters, it could perturb the state
estimate by an arbitrary amount without being detected by the bad data detector
employed at the control center. Such undetectable attacks are referred to as covert
data attacks.
There is an extensive literature on covert data attacks, following the work of
Liu, Ning, and Reiter [18]. While the data framing attack mechanism proposed
here is fundamentally different, insights gained in existing work are particularly
relevant. Here, we highlight some of these ideas in the literature.
The explicit link between covert attack on state estimation and system ob-
servability was made in [19, 23]. Consequently, classical observability conditions
[25, 26, 42] can be modified for that for covert attacks and used to develop meter
protection strategies [19, 24, 43–46]. A particularly important concept is the no-
tion of critical set of meters (or critical measurements) [26, 47, 48]. In assessing
the vulnerability of the grid, the minimum number of adversary meters necessary
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for a covert attack was suggested as the security index for the grid [20, 24]. Sub-
sequently, meter protection strategies were proposed in [21, 22] to maximize the
security index under the protection resource constraint.
The framing attack strategy considered here relies on bad data identification
and removal techniques that have long been subjects of study [40,41,47,49,50]. See
[51, 52] and references therein. Typically, the residue vectors in normalized forms
are widely used as statistics for the bad data test [40]. In particular, Mili et al. [50]
proposed a hypothesis testing method, in which the set of suspect measurements
are determined by the residue analysis in [40]. The use of non-quadratic cost
functions in state estimation was also studied to enhance the bad data identification
performance. Especially, the weighted least absolute value estimation [53–56] and
the least median of squares regression [57,58] were considered as alternatives with
comparably good performance. In this dissertation, we take the residue analysis
in [40] as a representative bad data test and analyze the effect of the framing
attack. However, the same analysis is applicable to general bad data tests.
Detection of data attacks on state estimation, referred to as state attacks, has
been also studied in various frameworks. Kosut et al. [24] presented a generalized
likelihood ratio test for detection. Morrow et al. [59] proposed the detection mech-
anism based on network parameter perturbation which deliberately modifies the
line parameters and probes whether the measurements respond accordingly to the
modification. Distributed detection and estimation of adversarial perturbation was
also studied in [60]. In an effort to minimize the detection delay, the attack detec-
tion was also formulated as a quickest detection problem, and modified CUSUM
algorithms were proposed [61–63].
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1.4.2 Contributions
We propose a data framing attack on power system state estimation. Specifi-
cally, we formulate the design of optimal data framing attack as a quadratically
constrained quadratic program (QCQP). To analyze the efficacy of the data fram-
ing attack, we present a sufficient condition under which the framing attack can
achieve an arbitrary perturbation of the state estimate by controlling only half
of the critical set of meters. We demonstrate with the IEEE 14-bus and 118-bus
networks that the sufficient condition holds in critical sets associated with cuts.
The optimal design of framing attack is based on a linearized system. In prac-
tice, a nonlinear state estimator is often used. We demonstrate that, under the
nonlinear measurement model, the framing attacks designed based on linearized
system model successfully perturb the state estimate, and the adversary can con-
trol the degree of perturbation as desired.
1.5 Organization
In Chapter 2, we consider detection of an attack-associated information flow in
communications networks. Specifically, the problem is formulated as detection of
an information flow based on timing measurements. We first start with a simpler
case of detection with a parametric flow model. Then, we present an unsupervised
and nonparametric flow detector. The detector is proved to be consistent for a
class of non-homogeneous Poisson traffic model. Lastly, the detector is tested and
compared with other benchmark techniques using real-world TCP and VoIP traces.
From Chapter 3, we consider data attacks in power networks. A data attack
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aimed at perturbing the topology estimate of the control center is studied. We first
study the attack for an adversary with global information. A necessary and suffi-
cient condition for an undetectable topology attack is presented, and the condition
is used to construct a simple graph-theoretical meter protection strategy. Then,
we consider an adversary with local information. An undetectable local attack is
presented and tested with the IEEE 14-bus and 118-bus networks.
In Chapter 4, we study a data framing attack on power system state estimation.
We present a new attack approach, which alters the adversary-controlled measure-
ments deliberately such that the bad data detection and identification rule falsely
removes measurements from normally operating meters while retaining adversari-
ally altered measurements. We first present the main idea of the attack and then
provide the optimization framework for the attack design. Controlling only half of
a critical set of meters, the proposed attack is shown to be able to perturb the state
estimate by an arbitrary degree. The numerical results with the IEEE benchmark
networks are provided.
Finally, Chapter 5 provides concluding remarks and comments on future works.
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CHAPTER 2
DETECTION OF INFORMATION FLOWS
2.1 Introduction
We consider the problem of detecting information flows through a pair of monitored
nodes as illustrated in Fig. 2.1. In particular, given the measurements of transmis-
sion timings from the monitored nodes, we are interested in determining whether
the two monitored nodes are engaged in relaying packets of certain information
flows (the alternative hypothesis), or they are merely transmitting independently
(the null hypothesis). The network of our interest can be either wireless or wired
as long as transmission timings can be measured.
The generic problem of flow detection arises from a number of practical applica-
tions, especially in the context of information forensics, network surveillance, and
anonymous networking. For example, in the so-called stepping-stone attack [1] in
a network, an adversary may attack a node by compromising a sequence of nodes
that serve as stepping stones. When the attacker is involved in an interactive ses-






Figure 2.1: In the above wireless network, the transmission timings of two nodes,
N1 and N2, are recorded. The horizontal axis is the time axis, and arrows represent
packet transmissions at different time points. As illustrated, packets of certain
information flows may travel through N1 and N2.
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detecting the presence of unexpected flows through monitored nodes, the network
owner can alert the possibility of an attack. Other applications include the detec-
tion of wormhole attack [64] in which a set of colluding nodes divert a valid network
flow through a “wormhole tunnel.” Understanding the problem of flow detection
is also valuable for the design and assessment of anonymous networks [65, 66].
We restrict ourselves to the use of timing measurements only. Such a restriction
is of course unnecessary because there are often other information available such as
source-destination addresses, packet statistics, etc.; a detector should incorporate
such side information. We choose to focus exclusively on the use of timing informa-
tion for two reasons. First, timing can only be distorted but cannot be hidden by
the transmitter, and its measurements can be obtained by simple devices. In con-
trast, source-destination addresses and packet characteristics can be masked using
standard techniques in anonymous networking [66]. Second, timing is a fundamen-
tal traffic characteristic. It is therefore useful to understand the extent that timing
reveals the presence of information flows. Furthermore, any side information, when
incorporated properly, will enhance the performance of techniques based solely on
timing information.
Even though transmission timings of nodes can be easily monitored, detect-
ing information flows based on timing measurements is non-trivial, partly because
of non-stationary traffic characteristics: transmission timings of nodes often have
time-varying intensities, and they may be bursty when interactive users are in-
volved. Moreover, in general, it is difficult to obtain an accurate parametric model
for the monitored traffic, especially when there is no prior knowledge about the
nature of the traffic and no training data available. The presence of noise-like
epochs is another source of difficulty. When an information flow travels through
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two nodes, the two nodes may have transmissions that do not belong to the flow.
They may multiplex transmissions of other flows that go through only one of the
two nodes, or intentionally superpose dummy transmissions to avoid detection. We
refer to the epochs of such transmissions as chaff epochs.
It is easy to see that, if a node can arbitrarily delay packets in a flow, timing
information is insufficient for detection. For latency-sensitive applications such
as VoIP, multimedia streaming, etc., however, packets must satisfy certain end-
to-end delay constraints, which make the presence of such flows detectable. For
instance, VoIP applications require end-to-end delays to be bounded above by 150
msec [67]. We will consider the constraint that flow packets should satisfy the
end-to-end delay constraint of ∆ seconds.
2.1.1 Summary of Results and Organization
Our results include three parts: a nonparametric flow detection algorithm for unidi-
rectional or bidirectional flows, the related performance analysis, and experiments
with synthetic and real data. In developing an algorithm, our main contribution is
a new nonparametric technique that does not rely on knowledge of traffic distribu-
tion; nor does it require a training data for either hypothesis. The key idea lies in
a particular transformation of the measurements that leads to distinct statistical
behaviors under two different hypotheses. The proposed detector does not assume
stationarity of traffic and hence is applicable in time-varying traffic conditions.
Furthermore, it is memory-efficient and has linear computational complexity with
respect to the sample size thereby making real-time inference feasible.
In algorithm analysis, we aim to give theoretical justifications for the proposed
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approach. To this end, we establish the consistency property of the proposed
detector for a class of non-homogeneous Poisson traffic.
The performance of our detector is evaluated using synthetic Poisson traffic,
LBL TCP traces [17], and real-world measurements from MSN VoIP sessions, and
comparison with other benchmark passive detectors is provided. LBL TCP traces
and MSN VoIP traces are of course not guaranteed to satisfy the assumptions
made in our algorithm analysis, and our results indicate a level of robustness.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 gives the notations
and definitions employed throughout the chapter and formulates flow detection
as a binary composite hypothesis testing problem. In Section 2.3, we consider
the simpler case where the parametric model of the traffic is available. Then,
Section 2.4 presents a nonparametric flow detection algorithm and its consistency
property. In Section 2.5, the proposed detector is evaluated using synthetic Poisson
traffic, LBL TCP traces, and MSN VoIP traffic. The proofs of theorems are given
in Section 2.6.
2.2 Mathematical Formulation
This section introduces notations and definitions and formulates flow detection as
one of binary composite hypothesis testing.
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2.2.1 Notations and Flow Models
Transmission timings of each node are modeled as a point process on [0, ∞), and
detectors begin recording the timings at time 0. Bold upper-case letters (e.g., S)
denote point processes, and bold lower-case letters (e.g., s) denote their realiza-
tions. S(i) represents the ith epoch (i.e., the time of the ith transmission) of S, and
s(i) is its realization. The upper-case script letter S denotes the set of epochs in
the realization s: S , {s(i), i ≥ 1}. In addition, we define a superposition operator⊕






i=1 ⊕ (bi)∞i=1 = (ci)∞i=1,





ordered in the increasing order.
First, we define a unidirectional flow as follow.
Definition 2.2.1 An ordered pair of point processes (F1, F2) forms a unidirec-
tional flow, if for any realization (f1, f2) there exists a bijection g : F1 → F2
satisfying g(s)− s ∈ [0, ∆] for all s ∈ F1.
As illustrated in Fig. 2.2, when packets of an information flow travel through
node N1 and node N2, F1 and F2 can be interpreted as the transmission timings
of the flow packets at N1 and N2 respectively. The bijection condition of g means
packet conservation; every flow packet sent by N1 is received and forwarded by N2.
The condition g(s)−s ∈ [0, ∆] means that every flow packet transmission satisfies
causality and the delay constraint ∆. Based on the above definition, we define
a bidirectional flow as a superposition of two unidirectional flows with opposite
directions.







Figure 2.2: Every packet transmission of a unidirectional flow is assumed to satisfy
packet conservation, causality, and the delay constraint ∆.




i (i.e., Fi = F
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i ⊕F21i ) such that (F121 , F122 )
and (F212 , F
21
1 ) are unidirectional flows.
We allow (F121 , F
12




1 ) to have zero rate, so that a unidirectional
flow is a special case of a bidirectional flow.
2.2.2 Problem Statement
We formulate detection of bidirectional flow as a binary composite hypothesis
testing problem. Let S1 and S2 denote the transmission processes of N1 and
N2, respectively. Given the measurements (si)
2
i=1 in [0, t], we test the following
hypotheses:
H0 : S1 and S2 are independent;
H1 : Si = Fi ⊕Wi, i = 1, 2, and (F1, F2) forms a bidirectional flow.
(2.1)
We further assume that, under H1,
1. F1 and F2 are point processes with non-zero rates
1.
2. F1 and F2 are not independent.





≥ δ almost surely, i = 1, 2.
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3. (F1,F2), W1, and W2 are independent.
H0 corresponds to the scenario that N1 and N2 have independent transmissions.
H1 corresponds to the scenario that N1 and N2 relay packets of information flows




i=1 represent the flow part and the
chaff part, respectively. Note that under both hypotheses, no restriction is imposed
on the marginal distributions of Si, Fi, and Wi.
The assumptions under H1 are imposed to make two hypotheses disjoint. The
first assumption implies that the bidirectional flow should have positive rate. The
second assumption means that the flow parts of N1 and N2 should not be indepen-
dent, and this assumption is expected to hold in general due to the delay constraint
∆. The third assumption implies that the chaff parts of N1 and N2 are indepen-
dent, and they are also independent of the flow part. We note here that the third
assumption is more restrictive than that used in earlier works [13, 14].
We employ the notion of Chernoff consistency [68] to evaluate the asymptotic
performance of detectors.
Definition 2.2.3 For j = 0, 1, Pj denotes the set of all possible distributions of
(Si)
2
i=1 under Hj. A detector δ((si)2i=1, t) is a function of the epochs of (si)2i=1 in
[0, t], which is equal to j if the decision is Hj. δ((si)2i=1, t) is said to be consistent
if




i=1, t) = 1) = 0, and




i=1, t) = 0) = 0.
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In other words, a detector is consistent if its false alarm and miss detection
probabilities vanish as t grows, under all possible distributions in P0 and P1. In
the following sections, we will reduce P0 and P1 to the sets of distributions sat-
isfying certain additional conditions, and prove the consistency of our detection
algorithms.
Intuitively, the greater the amount of chaff epochs, the harder the flow detection
becomes. To measure the relative strength of the flow part with respect to the chaff
part, we introduce the following definition of flow fraction.
Definition 2.2.4 Under H1, suppose that (Si)2i=1 consists of the bidirectional flow
(Fi)
2
i=1 and the chaff part (Wi)
2
i=1. Given a realization (si)
2
i=1, where si = fi ⊕
wi, i = 1, 2, the flow fraction of (si)
2




|Fi ∩ [0, t]|
2∑
i=1
|Si ∩ [0, t]|
, R , lim inf
t→∞
R(t) (2.2)
where |Fi ∩ [0, t]| is the number of flow packet transmissions at node Ni in [0, t],
and |Si ∩ [0, t]| is the number of total transmissions at node Ni in [0, t].
In other words, R(t) is the fraction of the flow epochs in the measurements up
to time t, and R is its limiting value.
2.3 Parametric Flow Detection
We begin with an easier case where an accurate parametric model for traffic is




i=1, the maximum schedulable flow fraction (R¯) as our decision
statistic. The flow detection algorithm is a threshold decision rule based on R¯.
The computation of the threshold, however, requires the knowledge of the traffic
distribution under H0, which we assume available at the moment; this assumption
is removed in Section 2.4.
2.3.1 Decision Statistic: Maximum Schedulable Flow Frac-
tion
Under both hypotheses, given a realization (si)
2
i=1 in [0, t], itsmaximum schedulable
flow fraction R¯(t) is defined as
R¯(t) , max
{(fi,wi)2i=1 : si = fi ⊕wi ∼ H1}
2∑
i=1
|Fi ∩ [0, t]|
2∑
i=1
|Si ∩ [0, t]|
where si = fi ⊕ wi ∼ H1 denotes the constraint that si = fi ⊕ wi, i = 1, 2,
and (f1, f2) is a realization
2 of a bidirectional flow. In other words, we schedule a
maximum number of bidirectional flow transmissions between s1 and s2 in [0, t],
and denote the fraction of the flow part by R¯(t).
To effectively evaluate R¯(t), we propose a matching algorithm called
Bidirectional-Bounded-Greedy-Match (BiBGM). To achieve its goal, BiBGM starts
with the first epoch in S1 ∪ S2, and subsequently finds the earliest one-to-one
matches satisfying causality and the delay constraint. We explain below the op-
eration of BiBGM using an example in Fig. 2.3 accompanied by a pseudocode




i such that there
exist bijections g1 : F
12
1 → F122 and g2 : F212 → F211 satisfying g1(s) − s ∈ [0, ∆], ∀s ∈ F121 and




1: m = n = 1;
2: while m ≤ |S1| and n ≤ |S2|
3: if s2(n) < s1(m)−∆
4: s2(n) is chaff; n← n+ 1;
5: else if s2(n) > s1(m) + ∆
6: s1(m) is chaff; m← m+ 1;
7: else






implementation in Table 2.1:
1. At the beginning, all the epochs in S1 ∪ S2 are unmatched. Start with the
earliest epoch in S1 ∪ S2, and go to MATCH to find its match.
2. MATCH: Let t denote the epoch for which we want to find a match. For
i = 1, 2, if t ∈ Si, search for the earliest unmatched epoch in [t, t+∆]∩S(3−i)
and match it with t; if there is no unmatched epoch in the interval, label t
as chaff (an epoch is said to be checked if it is either matched with another
epoch or labeled as chaff). Go to MOVE.
3. MOVE: If every epoch in S1 ∪ S2 is checked, terminate. Otherwise, move to
the next unchecked epoch in S1 ∪ S2 and go to MATCH to find its match.
For the example in Fig. 2.3, BiBGM starts with t1. Since t1 ∈ S1, we search for
the earliest unmatched epoch in [t1, t1+∆]∩ S2, which is t2. Hence, t1 is matched
with t2. Then, we move to the next unchecked epoch, t3 of S1. Because t2 is the












Next, we move to the next unchecked epoch (t4 of S2) and searches for the earliest
unmatched epoch in [t4, t4 + ∆] ∩ S1. BiBGM continues until the last epoch of
S1 ∪ S2 is checked.
From Table 2.1, it can be easily seen that BiBGM has linear computational
complexity with respect to the sample size (i.e., the total number of observed
epochs). The following theorem states that BiBGM indeed achieves the optimal
scheduling such that the flow part is maximized.
Theorem 2.3.1 Suppose we run BiBGM on (si)
2
i=1 in [0, t]. Then, the fraction
of the matched epochs is equal to R¯(t).
Proof : See Section 2.6.
2.3.2 Parametric Flow Detection under Poisson Models
In this section, we assume the knowledge of the underlying parametric model for
transmission processes and propose a detection algorithm called Bidirectional Flow
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Detector (BFD). BFD is a threshold decision rule based on R¯(t). Specifically, BFD
with a threshold τ takes the following form: If R¯(t) ≥ τ , declare H1;otherwise, declare H0.
If (Si)
2
i=1 contains a bidirectional flow, R¯(t) is, by definition, an upper bound on
R(t) and will tend to be greater compared to the case that (Si)
2
i=1 is an independent
pair; this is the intuition behind declaring H1 when R¯(t) is greater than τ .
Under H1, since R¯(t) ≥ R(t), BFD with τ can detect any flow with R(t) ≥ τ ,
and a smaller τ makes BFD capable of detecting a larger set of flows. However, a
smaller τ results in a higher false alarm probability. Hence, there exists a trade-
off between the detection ability of BFD and its false alarm probability, and we
need to consult the parametric model for (Si)
2
i=1 under H0 to find out how small
τ should be. Specifically, if under H0, as t increases R¯(t) converges to or stays
close to a certain constant τ0 with high probability, we can set τ slightly greater
than τ0 and make the false alarm probability become negligible as t grows. For
homogeneous Poisson traffic, the following convergence result gives a guidance for
setting τ .
Theorem 2.3.2 Under H0, if S1 and S2 are homogeneous Poisson processes with





(λ1 + λ2)(λ2 − λ1e2∆(λ1−λ2)) if λ1 6= λ2
2λ∆
1 + 2λ∆
if λ1 = λ2 = λ.




i=1 under H0 and (Wi)2i=1 under H1 are homogeneous Poisson
processes, the following theorem states that any bidirectional flow with a positive
rate is detectable regardless of the amount of chaff epochs.
Theorem 2.3.3 Suppose that (i) under H0, S1 and S2 are homogeneous Poisson
processes, (ii) under H1, W1 and W2 are homogeneous Poisson processes, and
(iii) under both hypotheses, the rates3 of S1 and S2 are λ1 and λ2, respectively.
Then, for any η ∈ (0, 1), there exists a proper threshold τ , such that BFD with
τ can consistently detect4 any bidirectional flow with R ≥ η a.s., with the false






, the following τ can be used:






1− λ1(4− η)− λ2η
λ2(4− η)− λ1ηe
2∆(λ1−λ2)
) if λ1 6= λ2,
η + 2λ(2− η)∆
2 + 2λ(2− η)∆ if λ1 = λ2 = λ.
Proof : See Section 2.6.
It can be shown that the suggested τ in Theorem 2.3.3 is a strictly increasing
function of η, and as η decreases to 0, it decreases to φ(λ1,λ2) in Theorem 2.3.2.
This means that to detect flows with smaller flow fraction, τ should be closer to
the limt→∞ R¯(t) value under H0.
Instead of the knowledge of the parametric model, training data can also be




= λi a.s., where Ni(t) denotes the number of epochs of
Si in [0, t].
4In other words, if the distributions of (Si)
2
i=1 under H0 and H1 satisfy (i), (ii), (iii), and
R ≥ η a.s., then under all those distributions, the false alarm and miss detection probability
vanish as t increases (as in Definition 2.2.3).
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used to set τ . If a large set of different realizations of H0 traffic is available, we can
run BiBGM over each realization in the training data set, estimate the statistical
behavior of R¯(t) under H0, and set τ such that the probability that R¯(t) ≥ τ under
H0 (i.e., false alarm probability) becomes reasonably small as t grows. However,
if neither a parametric model nor training data is available, it is non-trivial how
to determine an appropriate τ ; this is the case in many practical applications.
2.4 Nonparametric Flow Detection
In this section, we assume that neither a parametric model nor a training data set
is available, and present a novel nonparametric flow detector.
2.4.1 Algorithm Structure
We begin by introducing the structure and the main intuition of our detection al-
gorithm. Fig. 2.4 is describing its structure. A key component of our algorithm is
a transformation of measurements (si)
2
i=1, which we refer to as Independent Traf-
fic Approximation (ITA). As the name suggests, ITA produces an approximately
independent pair of transmission processes (s¯i)
2
i=1 such that s¯i has similar traffic
characteristics (e.g., normalized intensity5, interarrival distribution) with si. After
(s¯i)
2





If the true hypothesis is H0, both (si)2i=1 and (s¯i)2i=1 are independent pairs with
5The normalized intensity of Si for the [0, t] interval represents the overall trend of its intensity





exists for all x ∈ [0, t], where Ni[a, b) denotes the number of Si epochs in
[a, b). The normalized intensity λ¯(t) of Si for [0, t] is defined as the time-scaled version of the












Figure 2.4: The structure of the nonparametric detection algorithm.
similar traffic characteristics. On the other hand, if H1 is true, (si)2i=1 and (s¯i)2i=1
have similar traffic characteristics, but (si)
2
i=1 is a correlated pair containing a flow
while (s¯i)
2
i=1 approximates an independent pair. Thus, we attempt to infer the true





i=1: the larger the gap, the more probable H1 is.
2.4.2 Nonparametric Bidirectional Flow Detector
This section presents our detection algorithm, referred to as Nonparametric Bidi-
rectional Flow Detector (NBFD). Here, we simply assume that ITA generates an
output (s¯i)
2
i=1 with desired properties: (i) (s¯i)
2
i=1 approximates an independent
pair of transmission processes, and (ii) its normalized intensities and interarrival
distributions resemble that of (si)
2
i=1. The detail about ITA is delayed to the next
section, and here we focus on the operation of NBFD.
As described in Fig. 2.4, NBFD observes (si)
2
i=1 in [0, t] and first runs ITA
to generate (s¯i)
2





i=1. It was shown in Theorem 2.3.3, although stated under the
homogeneous Poisson traffic assumption, that the maximum schedulable flow frac-
tion R¯(t) can be effectively used to distinguish whether the measurements are
from a flow-containing pair or an independent pair. Moreover, R¯(t) can be easily
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i=1 and compares the fractions of the matched epochs
in the two cases, denoted by R¯(t) and τ¯(t) respectively. If the true hypothesis is
H0, both (Si)2i=1 and (S¯i)2i=1 are independent pairs, and they have similar normal-
ized intensities and interarrival distributions; this implies that R¯(t) and τ¯(t) are
expected to be close under H0. On the other hand, when H1 is true, (Si)2i=1 and
(S¯i)
2
i=1 have similar normalized intensity functions and interarrival distributions,
but (Si)
2
i=1 contains a flow while (S¯i)
2
i=1 approximates an independent pair; hence,
R¯(t) is expected to be greater than τ¯(t). Based on the above intuition, given (si)
2
i=1
in [0, t], NBFD with ǫ works as follows:
1. Run ITA on (si)
2
i=1 in [0, t] to generate (s¯i)
2
i=1.




i=1: R¯(t) and τ¯(t) denote the fractions of the





3. If R¯(t) ≥ τ¯(t) + ǫ, declare H1; otherwise, declare H0.
where ǫ is a positive number added to τ¯(t) to allow small difference between R¯(t)
and τ¯(t) under H0. τ¯(t) can also be seen as an estimate of what R¯(t) would be
under H0. Therefore, recalling the discussion of setting τ of BFD in Section 2.3.2,
NBFD can be alternatively interpreted as BFD with a measurement-dependent
threshold τ¯(t) + ǫ.
It is evident from the form of NBFD that a smaller ǫ will lead to the decrease
in the miss detection probability. However, the decrease in ǫ will increase the false
alarm probability. Because of the trade-off associated with the choice of ǫ and the









Figure 2.5: ITA samples w-second intervals {A1, A2, . . .} and {B1, B2, . . .} from
(si)
2
i=1 and assemble them to generate (s¯i)
2
i=1.
ǫ value is the best choice. The experimental results in Section 2.5 suggest that
setting ǫ ≈ 0.05 generally results in satisfactory performance.
2.4.3 Independent Traffic Approximation
In this section, we present how ITA approximates an independent pair of transmis-




Fig. 2.5 is illustrating the operation of ITA. ITA has two parameters: the sam-
pling window width w and the gap α (α ≥ ∆) between neighboring sampling
windows. As described in Fig. 2.5, ITA samples the epochs in the w-second win-
dows separated by α-second gaps, shifts them properly, and assembles them to
approximate independent traffic. The intuition behind ITA is that if the gap α
between two sampling windows is sufficiently large, the epochs in different win-
dows will tend to be approximately uncorrelated. Note that when (Si)
2
i=1 contains
a bidirectional flow, ITA disassembles the flow part and significantly reduces the
flow-induced correlation. In addition, since we use a sequence of sampled intervals
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Figure 2.6: S1 and S2 are non-homogeneous Poisson processes, and λ1(x) and λ2(x)
denote their local intensities at time x respectively. λ1(x) and λ2(x) can only take
values from {µ1, µ2} (µ1 6= µ2). The figure describes the intensity change of S1, S2,
S¯1, and S¯2 using two types of bars. The bars filled with slant lines represent the
intervals in which λi(x) = µ1, and the blue bars represent the intervals in which
λi(x) = µ2. The numbers above or below the intervals describe the correspondence
between the sampled intervals in Si and the intervals in S¯i.
To illustrate how the normalized intensities of Si and S¯i are related, Fig. 2.6




i=1 for an example where S1 and
S2 are non-homogeneous Poisson processes with two possible intensity levels. As
observed in Fig. 2.6, if the average time that the intensity of Si stays in one level
is much longer than 2(w + α) seconds, the normalized intensity function of S¯i is
similar to that of Si. About interarrival distribution, if w is sufficiently large so
that a w-second sampling window is likely to contain a large number of points, the
interarrival distribution of S¯i will resemble that of Si. Moreover, if the interarrival
distribution of Si varies slowly over time, as in the example of Fig. 2.6, the inter-
arrival distribution of S¯i will also change over time with the similar trend, even
though the time scale is different due to the sampling procedure of ITA. Note that
resampling from the empirical interarrival distributions (i.e., generating i.i.d. in-
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terarrival times of S¯i from the empirical interarrival distribution of Si, for i = 1, 2)





i=1 is non-stationary, the results of such resampling approaches may
have a totally different dynamics from (Si)
2
i=1; they may not capture the patterns
of intensity change or interarrival distribution change in (Si)
2
i=1.
Now, we will check whether (S¯i)
2
i=1 can approximate an independent pair.
When S1 and S2 are independent, it directly follows that S¯1 and S¯2 are inde-
pendent. On the other hand, if (Si)
2
i=1 contains a bidirectional flow, S¯1 and S¯2
are not necessarily independent. However, assuming that correlation across time
is weak and the gap α is much larger than ∆, the epochs in different windows
are expected to be approximately uncorrelated: i.e., in Fig. 2.5, the epochs in
each Ai will be approximately uncorrelated with the epochs in
⋃
j≥1Bj. This im-
plies that when temporal correlation is weak, (S¯1, S¯2) is expected to approximate
an independent pair. The following example illustrates a case where (Si)
2
i=1 has
weak temporal correlation. Suppose S1 is a Poisson process and S2 is such that
S2(i) = S1(i) + Di, ∀i, where Dis are independent random delays bounded by ∆
a.s.: i.e., (Si)
2
i=1 is a unidirectional flow with a delay constraint ∆. The memory-
less property of Poisson processes implies that epochs in an interval are correlated
with epochs in another disjoint interval only if the gap between the two intervals
is less than ∆ seconds. Hence, if α ≥ ∆, epochs in different sampling windows of
ITA are independent, implying that (S¯i)
2
i=1 is an independent pair.
Under H0, NBFD requires (S¯i)2i=1 to be an independent pair having the similar
traffic characteristics with (Si)
2
i=1, because R¯(t) and τ¯(t) have to be close under
H0. However, under H1, NBFD does not necessitate the independence of S¯1 and
S¯2, even though the independent case is ideal. Under H1, NBFD wants τ¯(t) to
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be less than R¯(t), and this can be achieved by making (S¯i)
2
i=1 very unlikely to
contain a flow. Because, as can be inferred from the discussion in Section 2.3.2,
the maximum schedulable flow fraction (e.g., R¯(t) and τ¯(t) of NBFD) tends to
be higher when the measurements come from a flow-containing pair. Note that
ITA does make (S¯i)
2
i=1 unlikely to contain a flow by tearing apart the flow part of
(Si)
2
i=1 in its sampling procedure.
Given the measurements (si)
2




1. Initially, s¯1 and s¯2 contain no epoch.
2. For i = 0, 1, . . . , ⌊ t
2(w+α)
⌋ − 1:
(a) Take the epochs of s1 in [2i(w+ α), 2i(w+ α) +w], subtract i(w+ 2α)
from the epochs, and add them to s¯1.
(b) Take the epochs of s2 in [(2i+1)(w+α), (2i+1)(w+α)+w], subtract
i(w + 2α) + (w + α) from the epochs, and add them to s¯2.
The implementation of ITA is given in Table 2.2. As can be seen from Table 2.2,
ITA has linear computational complexity with respect to the sample size.
One drawback of ITA is that it throws away more than a half of the mea-
surements during the sampling procedure, thereby restricting the sample size of
(s¯i)
2




i=1, together with (si)
2
i=1, is used
to calculate the decision statistic of NBFD, so a large sample size is desirable.
Therefore, we suggest a modification of ITA, referred to as ITA-double (ITAd), to




Table 2.2: Independent Traffic Approximation
ITA(s1, s2, t, w, α):
1: s¯1 ← (); s¯2 ← (); a1 ← (); a2 ← (); j = 1; k = 1;
2: for i = 0 : 1 : ⌊ t
2(w+α)
⌋ − 1
3: while s1(j) < 2i(w + α)
4: j ← j + 1;
5: end
6: while s1(j) ≤ 2i(w + α) + w
7: a1 ← a1 ⊕ s1(j); j ← j + 1;
8: end
9: while s2(k) < (2i+ 1)(w + α)
10: k ← k + 1;
11: end
12: while s2(k) ≤ (2i+ 1)(w + α) + w
13: a2 ← a2 ⊕ s2(k); k ← k + 1;
14: end
15: a1 ← a1 − i(w + 2α); s¯1 ← s¯1 ⊕ a1;
16: a2 ← a2 − (i(w + 2α) + w + α); s¯2 ← s¯2 ⊕ a2;





∗ For a sequence (xi)i≥1 and a real number r, (xi)i≥1 − r , (yi)i≥1 where
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B1B1 B2B2 B3B3
Figure 2.7: The sample size of (s¯i)
2
i=1 doubles compared to ITA. Unlike ITA, ITAd
does not throw away {A2, A4, . . .} or {B2, B4, . . .}; it assembles all of {A1, A2, . . .}
and {B1, B2, . . .} to generate (s¯i)2i=1.
The operation of ITAd is illustrated in Fig. 2.7. In ITAd, when S1 and S2 are
independent, so are S¯1 and S¯2. However, if (Si)
2
i=1 contains a flow, (S¯i)
2
i=1 is not
an independent pair, because the epochs in Ai+1 and those in Bi are correlated
due to the presence of the flow. However, (S¯i)
2
i=1 is a concatenation of w-second
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intervals, where, in each interval, the epochs of S¯1 and S¯2 are approximately uncor-
related. We believe that this property is enough for NBFD to sense the difference




i=1 under H1, especially when
w is large. Although we have no analytical proof for the superiority of ITAd over
ITA, the use of ITAd in NBFD instead of ITA consistently resulted in a better
performance in all our simulations and experiments in Section 2.5.
2.4.4 Performance Analysis
This section provides the analysis of algorithmic efficiency and consistency of
NBFD.
NBFD is efficient in terms of computation and memory requirement. Because
its main components, ITA and BiBGM, have linear complexity, NBFD also has
linear computational complexity with respect to the sample size. In addition,
assuming that NBFD with (w, α, ǫ) is executed in real-time over transmission





i=1 and the timing measurements in the most recent 2(w+α)-second
interval; they are all the information needed to continue running ITA and BiBGM
over the future timing measurements.
For a class of non-homogeneous Poisson traffic, NBFD has a consistency prop-
erty as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.4.1 Assume that w and α are any positive numbers with α ≥ ∆.
For any η ∈ (0, 1), there exists an ǫ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that, for any ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ¯], NBFD




i=1 under H0 and H1 satisfy the following assumptions6:
1. Under both hypotheses, S1 and S2 are non-homogeneous Poisson processes.
In addition, under H1, Si = (F12i ⊕ F21i ) ⊕Wi. F121 , F212 , W1, and W2
are independent non-homogeneous Poisson processes, F122 is
7 sort{F121 (i) +
αi, i ≥ 1}, and F211 is sort{F212 (i) + βi, i ≥ 1} where {αi, i ≥ 1} and
{βi, i ≥ 1} are random variables satisfying αi, βi ∈ [0,∆] almost surely.
Furthermore, {αi, i ≥ 1} ⊥ W1, {βi, i ≥ 1} ⊥ W2, and8 ⊥ {αi, i ≥
1}, {βi, i ≥ 1}, F121 , F212 .
2. Let λ1(t), λ2(t), λf1(t), and λf2(t) denote the local intensities of S1, S2, F
12
1 ,
and F212 respectively. There exist two finite sets Λ0 , {~µ(j) , (µ(j)1 , µ(j)2 ), 1 ≤
j ≤ M0} and Λ1 , {~λ(k) , (λ(k)1 , λ(k)2 , λ(k)f1 , λ(k)f2 ), 1 ≤ k ≤ M1} with µ(j)i >
0, λ
(k)
i > 0, i = 1, 2, ∀j, k. Under H0, (λ1(t), λ2(t)) can only take values in
Λ0. Under H1, ~λ(t) , (λ1(t), λ2(t), λf1(t), λf2(t)) can only take values in
Λ1.
3. Under H0, if c(t) denotes the number of times that (λ1(t), λ2(t)) changes its




= 0. Similarly, under H1, if c(t) denotes the





4. Under H0, if ρk(t) (1 ≤ k ≤ M0) denotes the fraction of the time in [0, t]
that (λ1(t), λ2(t)) = ~µ
(k), then as t increases, each ρk(t) converges. Similarly,
under H1, if ρk(t) (1 ≤ k ≤ M1) denotes the fraction of the time in [0, t]
that ~λ(t) = ~λ(k), then as t increases, each ρk(t) converges.
6In other words, if the distributions of (Si)
2
i=1 under H0 and H1 satisfy the listed assumptions
(including R ≥ η a.s. under H1), then under all those distributions, the false alarm and miss
detection probabilities of NBFD with (w, α, ǫ) vanish as t grows (as in Definition 2.2.3).
7For a countable set A of real numbers, sort{A} is the sequence of the elements of A ordered
in the increasing order.
8For random processes Ais, A1 ⊥ A2 means A1 and A2 are independent, and ⊥ A1, . . . , An
means A1, . . . , An are independent.
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Proof : See Section 2.6.
The first assumption means that under H1, (Si)2i=1 is a superposition of three
independent parts: the unidirectional flow from S1 to S2, the unidirectional flow
from S2 to S1, and the chaff parts. αi and βi represent packet delays of the two
unidirectional flows, and they satisfy certain independence relationships involving
the flow parts and the chaff parts. The first assumption is sufficient to guarantee
that the output of ITA, (S¯i)
2
i=1, is an independent pair under H1. The second
assumption implies that the local intensities of the total traffic and flows can only
take a finite number of different values. The third assumption says that the number
of intensity changes in [0, t] grows as o(t). Finally, the last assumption means that
the fraction of the time that the intensity vector assumes a specific value converges
as the observation time increases. Under these assumptions, Theorem 2.4.1 states
that a bidirectional flow with any positive rate can be consistently detected by
NBFD if ǫ is properly set. Note that the assumptions do not restrict traffic to be
stationary.
As pointed out by Paxson and Floyd [17], a Poisson process is not always a
good model for network arrival processes. Several network traces (e.g., Ethernet
and World Wide Web traffic) have been experimentally proved to display self-
similarity [69–71], which Poisson processes do not show. To test the performance
of NBFD over non-Poisson traffic, we will evaluate NBFD in the following section
using LBL TCP traces, which were used in [17] to invalidate Poisson modeling,
and real-world measurements from MSN VoIP sessions.
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2.5 Numerical Results
NBFD was tested using the synthetic Poisson traffic, LBL TCP traces, and the
real-world measurements from MSN VoIP sessions. Comparison with other passive
flow detectors is also provided: the wavelet analysis in [1], Detect-Attack-Chaff
(DAC) in [13], and the random projection method in [16].
The wavelet analysis [1] calculates the wavelet coefficients of N1(t) and N2(t)
using the mother Haar wavelet with a sufficiently large scale, where Ni(t) is the
number of epochs of Si in [0, t]. Then, it calculates the Peason’s correlation coeffi-
cient between the wavelet coefficients of N1(t) and that of N2(t), and declares H1 if
the correlation coefficient is greater than a predetermined threshold κ; otherwise,
it declares H0. The intuition of the algorithm is based on their analysis under
the Poisson traffic assumption: the correlation coefficient converges to a positive
constant as the scale9 grows to infinity if (Si)
2
i=1 contains a flow.
DAC [13] is based on the intuition that as t increases |N1(t) − N2(t)| tends
to grow large when S1 and S2 are independent, whereas it tends to stay small if
(Si)
2
i=1 contains a flow with a much higher rate than the chaff part. DAC with a
parameter10 p∆ monitors |N1(t)−N2(t)|. At every 8(p∆+1)2 packet transmissions,
both N1 and N2 are set to be zero and new counting begins. It declares H0 if
|N1(t) − N2(t)| grows larger than a threshold 2p∆. If |N1(t) − N2(t)| stays less
than 2p∆ during the whole observation duration, DAC declares H1. Note that
9Since the wavelet analysis relies on the convergence of the correlation coefficient as the scale
grows, a large scale is desired. However, given a fixed observation duration, using too large scale
can cause the sample size of the correlation coefficient estimation (i.e., the number of wavelet
coefficients) to be very small. To prevent this, in our experiments, the sample size is fixed to be
100, and the scale is set to be (the observation duration)/100.
10In [13], p∆ is defined to be a uniform upper bound on the number of epochs of a node (S1
or S2) in any ∆-sec interval. However, none of our test traces guarantees such a uniform upper
bound. Hence, we tried DAC with various p∆ values, which include large enough numbers to
bound the number of epochs in any ∆-sec interval with high probability.
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under H1, if bursty chaff transmissions occur in either node, |N1(t) − N2(t)| may
suddenly grow larger than 2p∆ thereby resulting in a miss detection. Hence, DAC
is vulnerable to bursty chaff insertion.
The random projection method in [16], which we denote by RP, is based on
the idea of measuring the distance between S1 and S2 after random projection. It
first partitions the observation interval into the time slots with length LTS, and
counts the number of epochs in each time slot. The number of epochs of Si in
the jth time slot is denoted by Vi(j), i = 1, 2, 1 ≤ j ≤ T . Then, RP generates
a set of K random basis vectors {Bk ∈ {−1, 1}T , 1 ≤ k ≤ K}, where each Bk(j)
(1 ≤ j ≤ T ) is either 1 or−1 with an equal probability11. After that, Vi is projected
on {Bk, 1 ≤ k ≤ K}: Ci(k) ,
∑
j Vi(j)Bk(j), i = 1, 2, 1 ≤ k ≤ K. Finally, RP
obtains a K-dimensional binary vector C¯i, where C¯i(k) , 1{Ci(k)>0}, referred to
as the binary sketch of Si. The decision statistic of RP is the Hamming distance
between C¯1 and C¯2. If the distance is less than a threshold th, RP declares H1;
otherwise, H0 is declared.
2.5.1 Simulation Results: Poisson Traffic and LBL traces
We first performed Monte Carlo simulations using the synthetic non-homogeneous
Poisson traffic. In the simulations, S1 and S2 are Poisson processes with intensity
functions λ1(t) and λ2(t) respectively. Under H1, (Si)2i=1 is a superposition of two
independent parts, the unidirectional flow (Fi)
2
i=1 and the chaff part (Wi)
2
i=1. F1
is a Poisson process with intensity function λf (t), and F2 is generated by adding a
random delay to each epoch of F1. Random delays are independent and identically
11About the parameters of RP, we used LTS = 0.5s, as recommended in [16]. As explained
in [16], large K is desired since it will allow us to extract more information from Si. We used
K = 4096, which we believe is sufficiently large (four times the maximum K used in [16]).
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distributed (i.i.d.) and uniformly distributed in [0, ∆], where ∆ = 0.1s. W1 and
W2 are independent Poisson processes with intensity functions λ1(t) − λf (t) and
λ2(t) − λf (t), respectively. In each run of the simulation, (λ1(t), λ2(t), λf (t)) is
piecewise constant, and it takes different values in the first third, the second third,
and the last third of the observation duration. Specifically, it follows one of the
below change scenarios with equal probability:
1. (15, 15, 5)→ (15, 15, 12)→ (15, 15, 7).
2. (25, 10, 8)→ (10, 10, 8)→ (10, 25, 8).
3. (25, 25, 20)→ (12, 12, 7)→ (8, 8, 3).
4. (21, 15, 14)→ (12, 6, 5)→ (12, 24, 5).
Under H0, S1 and S2 are independent Poisson processes, and in each run of the
simulation, (λ1(t), λ2(t)) follows one of the above change scenarios (with no λf
part) with equal probability. In real world, such changes in intensity may corre-
spond to the beginning of new sessions, the end of old sessions, the rate change of
existing sessions, and so on. All change scenarios have the same average rates, but
each scenario displays a different dynamics. By this simulation setting, we aimed
at testing the performance of detectors over the non-stationary traffic displaying
possibly a different dynamics at each observation interval.
Fig. 2.8 shows the ROC curves of NBFD (with ITAd), NBFD (with ITA), the
wavelet analysis, DAC, and RP. To obtain the ROC curves, we increased ǫ of
NBFD and κ of the wavelet analysis from 0 to 1 with an increment of 0.01, p∆ of
DAC from 4 to 100 with an increment of 2, and th of RP from 0 to K (K = 4096)
with an increment of 1 while plotting (PF , 1 − PM) of each case, where PF and
PM denote the false alarm probability and miss detection probability respectively.
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Figure 2.8: ROC curves of NBFD (ITAd), NBFD (ITA), the wavelet analysis,
DAC, and RP for different observation durations: NBFD parameters are w = 2s
and α = ∆ = 0.1s, and the number of Monte Carlo runs is 10000.
When we further increased the sample size, the ROC curves of NBFD (ITAd),
NBFD (ITA), and the wavelet analysis approached the upper left corner implying
that perfect detection is possible if the thresholds are properly set. On the other
hand, DAC and RP resulted in non-negligible error probabilities in every case, and
their ROC curves did not improve much from the curves in Fig. 2.8, even when we
further increased the observation duration to 160s. By comparing the ROC curves
of NBFD (ITAd) and NBFD (ITA), we can observe that ITAd, the heuristic to
double the sample size of (s¯i)
2
i=1, resulted in a better detection performance than
ITA. In all our simulations and experiments, ITAd consistently showed better
results than ITA. In the rest of this section, NBFD is assumed to employ ITAd
and will be compared with other detectors.
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To test the performance of detectors over non-Poisson traffic, we generated
synthetic traffic based on the TCP packet timestamps in LBL-PKT-3 (2 hours),
LBL-PKT-4 (1 hour), and LBL-PKT-5 (1 hour) in [17]. These traces were mea-
sured at the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory’s wide-area Internet gateway, and each
trace was gathered at a different date in January 1994. For the detail, refer to [17].
From each dataset, we extracted timestamps of TCP packets that originated from
specific users, and used them for traffic generation. For the flow part of H1 traffic,
timestamps of one user in LBL-PKT-3 were used as F1, and F2 was generated by
adding a delay to each epoch in F1. The delays are i.i.d. and uniformly distributed
in [0, ∆], where ∆ = 0.1s. For the chaff part, timestamps of one user in LBL-PKT-
4 were used asW1, and those of one user in LBL-PKT-5 were used asW2. For H0
traffic, S1 is generated by superposing traces of two users in LBL-PKT-4, and S2
is similarly generated with two users in LBL-PKT-5. Using different sets of users
for the traffic generation, we were able to create the four-hour long test traffic.
We tested DAC with various p∆ ranging from 10 to 400, but its miss detection
probability was higher than 0.38 in every case. This is not surprising because
DAC is vulnerable to bursty chaff transmissions and LBL TCP traces were shown
to be bursty in [17]. Table 2.3 shows the error probabilities of NBFD, the wavelet
analysis, and RP. For NBFD, we used ǫ = 0.05. For the wavelet analysis and
RP, assuming the absence of a parametric model and training data, we have no
clear standard to set their thresholds. Hence, we tried all values from 0 to 1 with
an increment of 0.01 for κ of the wavelet analysis and all values from 0 to 4096
with an increment of 1 for th of RP, and found their crossover error rates and the
corresponding thresholds, which are listed in Table 2.3. NBFD and the wavelet
analysis outperformed RP, and for long observation durations (160s and 320s),
NBFD performed better than the wavelet analysis.
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Table 2.3: Performance on LBL TCP traces. NBFD parameters are w = 2s,
α = ∆ = 0.1s, and ǫ = 0.05. The numbers of experiments are 180, 90, and 45
for observation duration 80s, 160s, and 320s, respectively. Under H0, the average
traffic rate is (λ1, λ2) = (36.4, 36.1). Under H1, (λ1, λ2) = (36.1, 36.8). The
fraction of chaff in H1 traffic is 0.37.
NBFD Wavelet RP
Time PF PM κ PF PM th PF PM
80s 0 0.100 0.19 0.034 0.056 762 0.101 0.144
160s 0 0.057 0.20 0.034 0.056 793 0.112 0.133
320s 0 0.022 0.19 0.023 0.067 774 0 0.089
2.5.2 Experimental Results: MSN VoIP Traffic
We tested the detectors using three-and-a-half-hour long real-world traffic involving
the MSN VoIP application12, which is a representative example of latency-sensitive
applications. Fig. 2.9 is illustrating the experimental setup. The laptop P1 is
located in the place covered by the wireless access point A1, and two other laptops,
P2 and P3, are located in the different place covered by the wireless access point
A2, which is controlled to serve only P2 and P3. Suppose it is known that P1 is
engaged in a VoIP conversation. By measuring the wireless transmission epochs
of P1 and A2, our objective is to detect whether P1 is having a VoIP conversation
with any device served by the access point A2. In practice, there may be additional
information available: packet sizes, protocol types (TCP or UDP), destination
addresses, and so on. However, here we assume that we have no access to such
information due to encryption or other countermeasures employed by the network
administrator, and only the timing measurements are available.
Let S1 and S2 denote the transmission processes of P1 and A2 respectively.
12Windows Live Messenger 2009 (14.0.8089.726) was used for MSN VoIP calls, and Wireshark
network protocol analyzer (ver 1.2.6.) with the AirPcap classic adaptor was used to record the




















Figure 2.9: If P1 has a VoIP conversation with either P2 or P3, the VoIP packets
should depart from P1 and travel through A2.
Under H1, P1 has a VoIP conversation with P2, and P3 downloads a file from
a distant FTP server with 20kB/s rate. Since A2 transmits packets for both P2
and P3, its transmission timings of FTP packets, destined for P3, form the chaff
part of S2. Under H0, P1 and P2 engage in independent VoIP conversations while
P3 does the same job as in H1. Hence, VoIP packet timings in S1 and those in
S2 are independent under H0. Under both hypotheses, the timings of network
control/management packets from P1 and A2 (except beacon frames of A2) are
also included in S1 and S2.
We used ∆ = 150ms in the detection algorithms, because 150ms is the upper
bound of acceptable end-to-end delays of VoIP packets recommended by ITU-T
recommendation G.114 [67]. We first tested DAC with various p∆ ranging from 10
to 400. Similar to the result on LBL TCP traces, the miss detection probability
was higher than 0.55 in every case due to the bursty chaff transmissions (i.e.,
bursty FTP transmissions from A2 to P3). Table 2.4 shows the error probabilities
of NBFD, the wavelet analysis, and RP. As in the test using LBL traces, we used
ǫ = 0.05 for NBFD; for the wavelet analysis and RP, the crossover error rates
and the corresponding thresholds are listed in the table. NBFD and the wavelet
analysis outperformed RP, and they displayed vanishing error probabilities as the
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Table 2.4: Performance on MSN VoIP data. NBFD parameters are w = 2s,
α = ∆ = 0.15s, and ǫ = 0.05. The numbers of experiments are 162, 81, and 40
for observation duration 80s, 160s, and 320s, respectively. Under H0 and H1, the
average rate is (λ1, λ2) = (26.8, 34.9). The fraction of chaff in H1 traffic is 0.18.
NBFD Wavelet RP
Time PF PM κ PF PM th PF PM
80s 0.086 0.056 0.14 0.093 0.093 949 0.086 0.099
160s 0 0.049 0.17 0.012 0.012 989 0.049 0.074
320s 0 0 0.23 0 0 1005 0.075 0.050
observation duration increases.
In all the tests we executed, NBFD and the wavelet analysis consistently out-
performed DAC and RP. Even though the wavelet analysis performed well over
most traces, we need to recall that the results in Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 were
possible because its threshold κ was set a posteriori to minimize its error prob-
abilities. If neither a training data set nor a parametric model is available, we
have no clear standard to set κ. For the further comparison of NBFD and the
wavelet analysis, Fig. 2.10 shows PF and PM of NBFD and the wavelet analysis
with various thresholds. We can observe that the optimal κ of the wavelet analysis
varies significantly for different observation durations and different test traces. For
instance, in the test result for synthetic Poisson traffic, κ ≈ 0.25 gave the best
performance when the observation duration is 80s, but it resulted in PM ≈ 0.85
for the 20s case. In addition, for the fixed observation duration of 80s, the optimal
κ for the Poisson traffic (≈ 0.25) and that for the VoIP traffic (≈ 0.15) are quite
different. In contrast, for NBFD, it can be observed that ǫ = 0.05 results in almost
optimal performance in every case. Especially, in every test, its false alarm prob-
ability vanished as the observation duration increases. This suggests that under
H0, the difference between R¯(t) and τ¯(t) of NBFD is well bounded by ǫ = 0.05.
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(a) Synthetic Poisson traffic






















(b) LBL TCP traces






















(c) MSN VoIP Experiment
Figure 2.10: False alarm and miss detection probabilities of the wavelet analysis
and NBFD with various thresholds.
2.6 Proofs
2.6.1 Proof of Theorem 2.3.1
We use the following lemma about the relation between BiBGM with ∆ and
Bounded-Greedy-Match (BGM) [13] with 2∆ (For the detail of BGM, refer to
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Section 4.A of [14]).
Lemma 2.6.0.1 Running BiBGM on (si)
2
i=1 with ∆ is equivalent to the following:
1. Increase all the epochs of s2 by ∆.
2. Apply BGM with the delay constraint 2∆ to the modified measurements.
Proof of Lemma 2.6.0.1: Let sˆ2 be a sequence generated by increasing every
epoch in s2 by ∆ (i.e., sˆ2(i) = s2(i)+∆, 1 ≤ i ≤ |S2|). Then, replacing s2(n) with
sˆ2(n)−∆ in Table 2.1 results in exactly the same pseudocode with BGM with 2∆
on (s1, sˆ2) (see Table 3 in [14] for the pseudocode). 
Note that (a, b) ∈ S1 × S2 and |a − b| < ∆ if and only if (a, b +∆) ∈ S1 × Sˆ2
and b + ∆ ∈ [a, a + 2∆]. Hence, the optimal partitioning of (si)2i=1 is equivalent
to partitioning (s1, sˆ2) into the unidirectional flow part (with the delay constraint
2∆) and the chaff part such that the flow part is maximized; BGM with 2∆ was
proved in [13] to achieve the optimal partitioning of (s1, sˆ2). Thus, Lemma 2.6.0.1
implies the result.
2.6.2 Proof of Theorem 2.3.2
Let Sˆ2 denote the point process with Sˆ2(i) = S2(i)+∆, i ≥ 1. Theorem 4.2 in [14]
showed that if we run BGM with 2∆ on (S1, Sˆ2), the fraction of the matched
epochs in total epochs converges a.s. to the following:
2λ1λ2(1− e2∆(λ1−λ2))
(λ1 + λ2)(λ2 − λ1e2∆(λ1−λ2)) if λ1 6= λ2
2λ∆
1 + 2λ∆
if λ1 = λ2 = λ
Therefore, Lemma 2.6.0.1 implies the result.
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2.6.3 Proof of Theorem 2.3.3
We first introduce the following lemma about the statistical behavior of R¯(t) under
H1.
Lemma 2.6.0.2 Suppose that the distributions of (Si)
2
i=1 under H1 satisfy the
conditions that (i) S1 and S2 have rates λ1 and λ2 respectively, (ii) (F1, F2) is a
bidirectional flow with rate13 λf , and (iii) W1 and W2 are homogeneous Poisson
processes. Then, under every distribution in H1, lim inft→∞ R¯(t) ≥ θ(λ1, λ2, λf ) a.s.,
where θ(λ1, λ2, λf ) is defined as
2λ1 − 2λ2(λ1−λfλ2−λf )e2∆(λ1−λ2)
(λ2 + λ1)(1− (λ1−λfλ2−λf )e2∆(λ1−λ2))
if λ1 6= λ2
λf + 2λ(λ− λf )∆
λ(1 + 2(λ− λf )∆) if λ1 = λ2 = λ







i=1 in [0, t], respectively. M(t) denotes the
number of the matched epochs found by running BiBGM over (Si)
2
i=1 in [0, t].




i=1 separately in [0, t]: Mˆ(t) de-
notes the sum of the number of the matched epochs in (Fi)
2
i=1 and that in (Wi)
2
i=1,
and R¯w(t) denotes the fraction of the matched epochs in (Wi)
2
i=1. Theorem 2.3.1
implies that running BiBGM on (Si)
2
i=1 results in a greater or an equal number of





















































φ(λ1−λf ,λ2−λf ) a.s..
It can be shown that the right hand side is θ(λ1, λ2, λf ). 
Let η be any fixed number in (0, 2min{λ1,λ2}
λ1+λ2
) and τ be the suggested threshold





. Let h(x) , θ(λ1, λ2, x).
It can be checked that h(x) is strictly increasing in [0, min{λ1, λ2}], and h(λˆf ) is
equal to τ .







R > λˆf , because R ≥ η > η2 . Lemma 2.6.0.2 and the
monotonicity of h give
lim inf
t→∞
R¯(t) ≥ θ(λ1,λ2,λf ) = h(λf ) > h(λˆf ) = τ a.s.
Hence, lim
t→∞
Pr(R¯(t) < τ) = 0.
(ii) False alarm probability: Note that h(0) = φ(λ1,λ2). Under H0,
lim
t→∞
R¯(t) = φ(λ1,λ2) = h(0) < h(λˆf ) = τ a.s.,
and thus lim
t→∞
Pr(R¯(t) ≥ τ) = 0. Furthermore, Lemma 2.6.0.1 and Theorem 6.4
in [14] imply the exponential decay of the false alarm probability.
2.6.4 Proof of Theorem 2.4.1






























Figure 2.11: In this example, M = 2, a1; 1 = 1, a1; 2 = 3, a1; 3 = 5, a2; 1 = 2, and
a2; 2 = 4. We ran BiBGM on (Si)
2
i=1 and marked the matches by the arrows. Some
matches consist of epochs in two different partitions, and they are marked by the
dashed arrows. The matches consisting of epochs in a single partition are marked
by the solid arrows. One can observe that each solid arrow in (Si)
2










Lemma 2.6.0.3 Suppose that S1 and S2 are non-homogeneous Poisson processes,
and their local intensities always stay in [λmin, λmax], where λmin > 0. As illus-
trated in Fig. 2.11, we partition [0, ∞) into a countable number of subintervals: Ii
denotes the ith subinterval, Ti is the length of Ii, and d(t) denotes the number of
Iis with Ii ⊂ [0, t]. Suppose d(t)t decreases to 0 as t grows.
Let M be a finite natural number and suppose we partition the set {Ii, i ≥ 1}
into M subsets {Iak; i , i ≥ 1}, 1 ≤ k ≤ M , where (ak; i)i≥1, 1 ≤ k ≤ M , are
subsequences of (1, 2, 3, . . .). For 1 ≤ k ≤ M , we use the epochs of (Si)2i=1 in









2 have no epoch.
2. For n ≥ 1, for i = 1, 2, subtract ∑ak;n−1j=1 Tj from all the epochs of Si in the
interval Iak;n, add
∑n−1
j=1 Tak; j to them, and add these epochs to S
(k)
i .
Let N(t) denote the number of epochs of (Si)
2
i=1 in [0, t] and N
(k)(t) denote
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i=1, whose original epoch in (Si)
2




(k)(t). We run BiBGM on (Si)
2
i=1 and let R¯(t) denote





i=1 separately for each k, and N
(k)
f (t) denotes the number of the












Then, limt→∞ R¯(t)− Rˆ(t) = 0 almost surely.
Proof of Lemma 2.6.0.3: Let Nf (t) denote the number of BiBGM-matched
epochs of (Si)
2
i=1 in [0, t]. Then, by definition, R¯(t) =
Nf (t)
N(t)
. Let di denote the
time that the ith division occurs; in other words, di is the time that the ith jump
of d(t) occurs. Formally, we say that a BiBGM match (t1, t2), where ti is an epoch
of Si, is broken if t1 ∈ Ia, t2 ∈ Ib, and a 6= b. Let N˜f (t) denote the number of
epochs of the unbroken BiBGM matches in [0, t]. As described in Fig. 2.11, if an
unbroken BiBGM match (t1, t2) in [0, t] is such that t1 and t2 are included in a





i=1, where ρk(t) is the fraction of (
⋃
i≥1 Iak; i) ∩ [0, t] in [0, t]. In addition,
Theorem 2.3.1 implies that N
(k)
f (t) is no less than the number of epochs belonging









f (t) ≥ N˜f (t).
For j = 1, 2, let Xj(i) denote the number of epochs of Sj in [max{di−1+di2 , di−
∆}, min{di+di+1
2
, di +∆}), where d0 , −d1. The number of epochs of the broken











There exist sequences of i.i.d. Poisson random variables (X¯1(i))i≥1 and (X¯2(i))i≥1
with mean 2λmax∆ such that Xj(i) ≤ X¯j(i) a.s. for i ≥ 1, j = 1, 2. Hence,∑M
k=1N
(k)


























(R¯(t)− Rˆ(t)) ≤ 0 a.s..




i=1 at time points (dk; i)i≥1, where dk; i ,∑i





[0, tρk(t)], 1 ≤ k ≤ M , to obtain a lower bound on the number of BiBGM
matches of (Si)
2
i=1 in [0, t]. Then, based on the similar argument, we can de-
rive lim inft→∞(R¯(t) − Rˆ(t)) ≥ 0 a.s.. Hence, we have limt→∞(R¯(t) − Rˆ(t)) = 0
a.s., and the proof is complete. 
The proof of Theorem 2.4.1 consists of two parts: one for proving the vanishing
false alarm probability under H0, and the other for proving the vanishing miss
detection probability under H1.
False Alarm Probability
Suppose that H0 is true and the distribution of (Si)2i=1 satisfies the assumptions
of the theorem. S1 and S2 are independent non-homogeneous Poisson processes,
and so are the output of ITA, S¯1 and S¯2. Suppose we run BiBGM on (Si)
2
i=1 and
let R¯(t) denote the fraction of the matched epochs in the total epochs in [0, t].
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We also run BiBGM on (S¯i)
2
i=1 and let T¯(t) denote the fraction of the matched
epochs in the total epochs in [0, ⌊ t
2(w+α)
⌋w]. In the following, we will show that




= 0, there are at most a countable number of intensity
changes. Let (ci)i≥1 denote the increasing sequence of the time points at which
(λ1(t), λ2(t)) changes. We partition [0, ∞) into a countable number of subintervals
{Ii , [ci−1, ci), i ≥ 1}. For 1 ≤ k ≤ M0, (ak; i)i≥1 denotes the increasing sequence
of all the indices of Iis in which (λ1(t), λ2(t)) = ~µ
(k). For each k, we use the epochs
of (Si)
2






Let N(t) denote the number of epochs of (Si)
2





i=1 separately for 1 ≤ k ≤ M0. N (k)(t) denotes the number




i=1 in [0, tρk(t)], and N
(k)
f (t) denotes the number of BiBGM-
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2 ). The bars filled with slant lines represent the
intervals in which λi(t) = µ
(1)
i , and the blue bars represent the intervals in which
λi(t) = µ
(2)
i . In this example, J2 and J4 are in C.




ci, ∀i. As depicted in Fig. 2.12, the local intensities of S¯1 and S¯2,




2 ) with j 6= k, and it happens
only if any c¯i is in [w⌊ tw⌋, w(⌊ tw⌋+ 1)). Define C as a set
{[w(k − 1), wk) : k ∈ N, ∃ i s.t. c¯i ∈ [w(k − 1), wk)}
As illustrated in Fig. 2.12, we partition [0, ∞) of (S¯i)2i=1 into the intervals in C
and the gap intervals between two adjacent intervals in C, and (Ji)i≥1 denotes
the sequence of these intervals arranged in a time order. {a¯0; i, i ≥ 1} denotes
the increasing sequence of the indices of Jis satisfying Ji ∈ C. For 1 ≤ k ≤
M0, {a¯k; i, i ≥ 1} denotes the increasing sequence of the indices of Jis satisfying
(λ¯1(t), λ¯2(t)) = ~µ
(k), ∀t ∈ Ji. Then, {Ji, i ≥ 1} can be partitioned into the
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(M0 + 1) sets, {Ja¯k; i , i ≥ 1}, 0 ≤ k ≤ M0. For 0 ≤ k ≤ M0, we use the epochs
of (S¯i)
2














i=1 (0 ≤ k ≤ M0), we can use the similar argument as in obtaining


















From (2.3) and (2.4), we can see that R¯(t) − T¯(t) converges almost surely to




PF (t) = lim
t→∞
Pr(R¯(t)− T¯(t) > ǫ) = 0
Miss Detection Probability
Suppose that H1 is true and the distribution of (Si)2i=1 satisfies the assumptions
of the theorem including R ≥ η a.s. Due to the almost sure convergence of R(t),












where ρk , limt→∞ ρk(t). In addition, the first assumption of the theorem guar-
antees that S¯1 and S¯2 are independent non-homogeneous Poisson processes. We
run BiBGM on (Si)
2
i=1 and let R¯(t) denote the fraction of the matched epochs
in the total epochs in [0, t]. We also run BiBGM on (S¯i)
2
i=1 and let T¯(t) denote
the fraction of the matched epochs in the total epochs in [0, ⌊ t
2(w+α)
⌋w]. First of
all, by following exactly the same steps as in the proof of vanishing false alarm
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Let (ci)i≥1 denote the increasing sequence of the time points at which ~λ(t)
changes, and we partition [0, ∞) into a countable number of subintervals {Ii ,
[ci−1, ci), i ≥ 1}. For 1 ≤ k ≤ M1, let (ak; i)i≥1 denote the increasing sequence of
all the indices of Iis satisfying ~λ(t) = ~λ
(k), ∀t ∈ Ii. We use the epochs of (Si)2i=1




i=1, as in Lemma 2.6.0.3.




i=1 (1 ≤ k ≤ M1), we
can use the similar argument as in obtaining limt→∞ R¯(t) in the proof of vanishing






















where θ is defined in Lemma 2.6.0.2. For fixed λ1 and λ2, θ(λ1,λ2,λf ) is a strictly
increasing function of λf , and it decreases to φ(λ1, λ2) as λf decays to 0. Hence, if





































where the minimization is over {(ρk)M1k=1 : (2.5) holds}, then it can be easily seen
that γ is strictly greater than 0. Set ǫ¯ = 1
3
γ, and let ǫ be an arbitrary number in
(0, ǫ¯]. Then, if the condition (2.5) holds,
lim inf
t→∞
(R¯(t)− T¯(t)) ≥ γ > 2ǫ a.s..
Therefore, as long as the condition (2.5) holds, the miss detection probability





Pr(R¯(t)− T¯(t) < ǫ) = 0.
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CHAPTER 3
TOPOLOGY ATTACK OF A POWER GRID
3.1 Introduction
A defining feature of a smart grid is its abilities to monitor the state of a large
power grid, to adapt to changing operating conditions, and to react intelligently
to contingencies, all of which depend critically on a reliable and secure cyber-
infrastructure. It has been widely recognized that the heavy reliance on a wide
area communications network for grid monitoring and real-time operation comes
with increasing security risks of cyber-attacks. See [72] for a vulnerability analysis
of energy delivery control systems.
While information security has been a major focus of research for over half a
century, the mechanisms and the impacts of attack on cyber physical systems such
as the power grid are not yet well understood, and effective countermeasures are
still lacking.
We consider a form of “man-in-the-middle” (MiM) attack [73] on the topology
of a power grid. An MiM attack exploits the lack of authentication in a system,
which allows an adversary to impersonate a legitimate participant. In the context
of monitoring a transmission grid, sophisticated authentications are typically not
implemented due to the need of reducing communication delay and the presence of
legacy communication equipment. If an adversary is able to gain access to remote
terminal units (RTUs) or local data concentrators, it is possible for the adversary
to replace actual data packets with carefully constructed malicious data packets
and impersonate a valid data source.
57
MiM attacks on a power grid may have severe consequences. The adversary
can mislead the control center that the grid is operating under a topology different
from that in reality. Such an attack, if launched successfully and undetected by
the control center, will have serious implications: a grid that is under stress may
appear to be normal to the operator thereby delaying the deployment of necessary
measures to ensure stability. Similarly, a grid operating normally may appear to
be under stress to the operator, potentially causing load shedding and other costly
remedial actions by the operator.
Launching a topology attack, fortunately, is not easy; a modern energy man-
agement system is equipped with relatively sophisticated bad data and topology
error detectors, which alerts the operator that either the data in use are suspi-
cious or there may indeed be changes in the network topology. When there are
inconsistencies between the estimated network topology (estimated mostly using
switch and breaker states) and the meter data (e.g., there is significant amount of
power flow on a line disconnected in the estimated topology,) the operator takes
actions to validate the data in use. Only if data and the estimated topology pass
the bad data test, will the topology change be accepted and updates be made for
subsequent actions.
The attacks that are perhaps the most dangerous are those that pass the bad
data detection so that the control center accepts the change (or the lack of change)
of network topology. To launch such attacks, the adversary needs to modify si-
multaneously the meter data and the network data (switch and breaker states) in
such a way that the estimated topology is consistent with the data. Such attacks
are referred to as undetectable attacks; they are the main focus of this study.
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3.1.1 Summary of Results and Organization
We aim to achieve two objectives. First, we characterize conditions under which
undetectable attacks are possible, given a set of vulnerable meters that may be
controlled by an adversary. To this end, we consider two attack regimes based on
the information set available to the attacker. The more information the attacker
has, the stronger its ability to launch a sophisticated attack that is hard to detect.
The global information regime is where the attacker can observe all meter and
network data before altering the adversary-controlled part of them. Although it is
unlikely in practice that an adversary is able to operate in such a regime, in ana-
lyzing the impact of attacks, it is typical to consider the worst case by granting the
adversary additional power. In Section 3.3, we present a necessary and sufficient
algebraic condition under which, given a set of adversary controlled meters, there
exists an undetectable attack that misleads the control center with an incorrect
“target” topology. This algebraic condition provides not only numerical ways to
check if the grid is vulnerable to undetectable attacks but also insights into which
meters to protect to defend against topology attacks. We also provide specific
constructions of attacks and show certain optimality of the proposed attacks.
A more practically significant situation is the local information regime where
the attacker has only local information from those meters it has gained control.
Under certain conditions, undetectable attacks exist and can be implemented easily
based on simple heuristics. We present in Section 3.4 intuitions behind such simple
attacks and implementation details.
The second objective is to provide conditions under which topology attack
cannot be made undetectable. Such a condition, even if it may not be the tightest,
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provides insights into defense mechanisms against topology attacks. In Section 3.5,
we show that if a set of meters satisfying a certain branch covering property are
protected, then topology attacks can always be detected. In practice, protecting a
meter may be carried out at multiple levels, from physical protection measures to
software protection schemes using more sophisticated authentication protocols.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents mathemati-
cal models of state estimation, bad data test, and topology attacks. In Section 3.3,
we study topology attacks in the global information regime. The algebraic condi-
tion for an undetectable attack is presented, and construction of a cost-effective
undetectable attack is provided. Section 3.4 presents a heuristic attack for the
attacker with local information. Based on the algebraic condition presented in
Section 3.3, Section 3.5 provides a graph theoretical strategy to add protection to
a subset of meters to prevent undetectable attacks. Section 3.6 presents simulation
results to demonstrate practical uses of our analysis and feasibility of the proposed
attacks.
3.2 Preliminaries
In this section, we present models for the power network, measurements, and
adversary attacks. We also summarize essential operations such as state estimation
and bad data detection that are targets of data attacks.
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3.2.1 Network and Measurement Models
The control center receives two types of data from meters and sensors deployed
throughout the grid. One is the digital network data s ∈ {0, 1}d, which can be
represented as a string of binary bits indicating the on and off states of various
switches and line breakers. The second type is the analog meter data z, which is
a vector of bus injection and line flow measurements.
Without an attack or a sensing error, s gives the true breaker states. Each s ∈
{0, 1}d corresponds to a system topology, which is represented by a directed graph
G = (V,E), where V is the set of buses and E is the set of connected transmission
lines. For each physical transmission line between two buses (e.g., i and j), we
assign an arbitrary direction for the line (e.g., (i, j)), and (i, j) is in E if and
only if the line is connected. In addition, E0 denotes the set of all lines (with
the assigned directions), both connected and disconnected. Assigning arbitrary
directions for lines is not intended to deliver any physical meaning, but only for
ease of presentation.
The state of a power system is defined as the vector x of voltage phasors on all
buses. In the absence of attacks and measurement noise, the meter data z collected
by the SCADA system are related to the system state x and the system topology
G via the AC power flow model [51]:
z = h(x,G) + e (3.1)
where z typically includes real and reactive parts of bus injection and line flow
measurements, h is the nonlinear measurement function of x and G, and e the
additive noise.
A simplified model, one that is often used in real-time operations such as the
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computation of real-time LMP, is the so-called DC model [51] where the nonlinear
function h is linearized near the operating point. In particular, the DC model is
given by
z = Hx+ e (3.2)
where z ∈ Rm consists of only the real parts of injection and line flow measure-
ments, H ∈ Rm×n is the measurement matrix, x ∈ Rn is the state vector consisting
of voltage phase angles at all buses except the slack bus, and e ∈ Rm is the Gaus-
sian measurement noise with a diagonal covariance matrix Σ.
The fact that the measurement matrix H depends on the network topology G
is important, although we use the notation H without explicit association with
its topology G for notational convenience. For ease of presentation, consider the
noiseless measurement z = Hx. If an entry zk of z is the measurement of the line
flow from i to j of a connected line in G, zk is Bij(xi − xj) where Bij is the line
susceptance and xi is the voltage phase angle at bus i. The corresponding row of
H is equal to
h(i,j) , [0 · · · 0 Bij︸︷︷︸ 0 · · · 0 −Bij︸ ︷︷ ︸ 0 · · · 0].
ith entry jth entry
(3.3)
On the other hand, if zk is the measurement of the line flow through a disconnected
line in G, zk is zero, and the corresponding row of H consists of all zero entries.
If zk is the measurement of bus injection at i, it is the sum of all the outgoing
line flows from i, and the corresponding row of H is the sum of the row vectors
corresponding to all the outgoing line flows.
We consider both AC and DC power flow models. The DC model allows us
to obtain a succinct characterization of undetectable attacks as described in Sec-
tion 3.3. However, these results hold only locally around the operating point,
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because the results are obtained from the linearized model. General results for
the more realistic (nonlinear) AC model are difficult to obtain. We present in
Section 3.4 a heuristic attack that are undetectable for both AC and DC models.
It was shown in [39] that using the DC model and linear state estimator in
numerical analysis of an attack tends to exaggerate the impact of the attack.
Hence, for accurate analysis, we use the AC model and nonlinear state estimator
in the numerical simulations presented in Section 3.6.
3.2.2 Adversary Model
The adversary aims at modifying the topology estimate from G = (V,E) to a
different “target” topology G¯ = (V, E¯). Note that G and G¯ have the same set
of vertices. In other words, we only consider the attacks aimed at perturbing
transmission line connectivities1. In addition, we assume that the power system
is observable regardless an attack is present or not: i.e., the measurement matrix
in the DC model always has full rank. This means that the adversary avoids
misleading the control center with drastic system changes (e.g., division into two
diconnected parts) that may draw too much attention of the control center2. We
call the lines not common to both E¯ and E (i.e., lines in E¯△E , (E¯ \ E) ∪ (E \ E¯))
target lines and the buses at the ends of the target lines target buses.
To alter the network topology, the adversary launches a man-in-the-middle
1The attacks aiming to split or combine buses are out of scope of this chapter. Such attacks
require modifying the measurements of breaker states inside substations. If the control center
employs generalized state estimation [74], such modification invokes substation-level state esti-
mation which leads to a robust bad data test. Hence, such attacks are harder to avoid detection.
2In fact, the results to be presented in this chapter also hold for the general case where the
target topology can be anything (e.g., the system may be divided into several disconnected parts),






















Figure 3.1: Attack Model with Generalized State Estimation
attack as described in Fig. 3.1: it intercepts (s, z) from RTUs, modifies part of
them, and forwards the modified version (s¯, z¯) to the control center.
Throughout this chapter, except in Section 3.4, we assume that the adversary
has global information, i.e., it knows network parameters and observes all entries
of (s, z) before launching the attack, although it may modify only the entries it
gained control of. Such an unlimited access to network parameters and data is
a huge advantage to the attacker. In Section 3.5, countermeasures are designed
under this assumption so that they can be robust to such worst case attacks.
The mathematical model of an attack to modify G to G¯ is as follows (the
notation that a bar is on a variable denotes the value modified by the adversary):
s¯ = s+ b (mod 2),
z¯ = z+ a(z), a(z) ∈ A,
(3.4)
where s¯ is the modified network data corresponding to G¯, b ∈ {0, 1}d represents
the modifications on the network data s, a(z) ∈ Rm denotes the attack vector
added to the meter data z, and A ⊂ Rm denotes the subspace of feasible attack
vectors.
We assume that the adversary can modify the network data accordingly for any
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target topology that deems to be valid to the control center. This is the opposite of
the assumption employed by most existing studies on state attacks where network
data that specify the topology are not under attack.
For the attack on analog meter data, we use the notation a(z) to emphasize
that the adversary can design the attack vector based on the whole meter data
z. This assumption will be relaxed in Section 3.4 to study an attack with local
information. In addition, A has a form of {c ∈ Rm : ci = 0, i ∈ IS} where IS
is the set of indices of secure meter data entries that the adversary cannot alter
and {1, . . . ,m} \ IS represents the adversary-controlled entries. Note that A fully
characterizes the power of the adversary, and the mapping a : Rm → A fully
defines the attack strategy.
3.2.3 State Estimation, Bad Data Test, and Undetectable
Attacks
As illustrated in Fig. 3.1, the control center executes generalized state estimation
(GSE) [74] with network and meter data as inputs; the inputs are (s, z) in the
absence of an attack and (s¯, z¯) if there is an attack. GSE regards both network
and meter data as possibly erroneous. Once the bad data test detects inconsistency
among data and estimates, GSE filters out the outliers from the data and searches
for a new pair of topology and state estimates that fit the data best. Our focus
is on the attacks that can pass the bad data test such that no alarm is raised by
GSE.
Under the general AC model (3.1), if (s, z) is the input to GSE, and Gˆ is the
topology corresponding to s, the control center obtains the weighted least squares
65
(WLS) estimate of the state x:
xˆ = argmin
y
(z− h(y, Gˆ))tΣ−1(z− h(y, Gˆ)).
Note that Gˆ = G in the absence of an attack while Gˆ = G¯ in the presence of an
attack. In practice, nonlinear WLS estimation is implemented numerically [51].
Under the DC model (3.2), the WLS state estimator is a linear estimator with




= (Hˆ tΣ−1Hˆ)−1Hˆ tΣ−1z,
where Hˆ is the measurement matrix for Gˆ. The linear estimator is sometimes used
as part of an iterative procedure to obtain the nonlinear WLS solution.
The residue error is often used at the control center for bad data detection [51].
In the so-called J(xˆ) test [40], the weighted least squares error
J(xˆ) = (z− h(xˆ, Gˆ))tΣ−1(z− h(xˆ, Gˆ))
is used in a threshold test: bad data if J(xˆ) > τ ,good data if J(xˆ) ≤ τ , (3.5)
where τ is the detection threshold, and it is determined to satisfy a certain false
alarm constraint α.
We define that an attack is undetectable if its detection probability is as low as
the false alarm rate of the detector. We assume that the J(xˆ) test is used as the
bad data detector.
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Definition 3.2.1 An attack a to modify G to G¯ is said to be undetectable if, for
any true state x, the J(xˆ)-test with any false alarm constraint detects the attack
with the detection probability no greater than its false alarm rate.
In the absence of noise, the only source of bad data is, presumably, an attack.
In this case, the probabilistic statement of undetectability becomes a deterministic
one. A data attack (z + a(z), s¯) that modifies the topology from G to G¯ is unde-
tectable if for every noiseless measurement z, there exists a state vector x¯ such
that z + a(z) = h(x¯, G¯). Unfortunately, such a nonlinear condition is difficult to
check.
Under the DC model, however, the undetectability condition has a simple al-
gebraic form. Let (s, z) be the input to GSE and H is the measurement matrix
for the topology corresponding to s. In the presence of an attack, GSE receives
(s¯, z¯) instead of (s, z), and H¯–the measurement matrix for the target topology
G¯–replaces H. In the absence of noise, the J(xˆ)-detector is equivalent to checking
whether the received meter data is in the column space of the valid measurement
matrix. Thus, the equivalent undetectable topology attack can be defined by the
following easily checkable form:
Definition 3.2.2 An attack to modify G to G¯ with the attack vector a is said to
be undetectable if
z+ a(z) ∈ Col(H¯), ∀z ∈ Col(H), (3.6)
where H and H¯ are the measurement matrices for G and G¯ respectively, and Col(H)
is the column space of H and Col(H¯) the column space of H¯.
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3.3 Topology Attack with Global Information
We assume the DC model (3.2) and present the result for the existence of unde-
tectable topology attacks.
3.3.1 Condition for an Undetectable Attack
We first derive a necessary and sufficient algebraic condition for existence of an
undetectable attack that modifies G to G¯ with the subspace A of feasible attack
vectors. To motivate the general result, consider first the noiseless case.
Noiseless Measurement Case
Suppose there is an undetectable attack a with a(z) ∈ A, ∀z ∈ Col(H). Then,
undetectability implies that z+a(z) ∈ Col(H¯), ∀z ∈ Col(H), and thus, Col(H) ⊂
Col(H¯,A).3
Now suppose Col(H) ⊂ Col(H¯,A). There exists a basis {c1, . . . , cp,d1, . . . ,dq}
of Col(H¯,A) such that {c1, . . . , cp} is a subset of columns of H¯ and {d1, . . . ,dq}
is a set of linearly independent vectors in A. For any z ∈ Col(H), since Col(H) ⊂
Col(H¯,A), there exist unique (αi)
p
i=1 ∈ Rp and (βj)qj=1 such that z =
∑p
i=1 αici +∑q
j=1 βjdj. If we set a(z) = −
∑q
j=1 βjdj, z + a(z) =
∑p
i=1 αici ∈ Col(H¯). In
addition, a(z) ∈ A for all z. Hence, there exists an undetectable attack with the
subspace A of feasible attack vectors.
The above arguments lead to the following theorem.
3Col(H¯,A) denotes the space spanned by the columns of H¯ and a basis of A.
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Theorem 3.3.1 There exists an undetectable attack to modify G to G¯ with the
subspace A of feasible attack vectors if and only if Col(H) ⊂ Col(H¯, A).
Noisy Measurement Case
The following theorem states that the algebraic condition in Theorem 3.3.1 can
also be used in the noisy measurement case.
Theorem 3.3.2 There exists an undetectable attack to modify G to G¯ with the
subspace A of feasible attack vectors if and only if Col(H) ⊂ Col(H¯, A).
In addition, if an attack a is such that Col(H) * Col(H¯, A), then for almost
every4 x ∈ Rn, when x is the true state, the detection probability for the attack
approaches 1 as the noise variances uniformly decrease to 0 (i.e., maxi(Σii), where
Σii is the (i, i) entry of Σ, decays to 0).
Proof: See Section 3.7.
Note that when the algebraic condition is not met, the attack can be detected
with high probability if the noise variances are sufficiently small. With this alge-
braic condition, we can check whether the adversary can launch an undetectable
attack with A for the target G¯. The condition will be used in Section 3.5 to con-
struct a meter protection strategy to disable undetectable attacks for any target
topology.
By finding the smallest dimension of A satisfying the condition, we can also
characterize the minimum cost of undetectable attacks for G¯; in the adversary’s
4This means “for all x ∈ Rn \ S, for some S ⊂ Rn with a zero Lebesgue measure”.
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point of view, a smaller dimension of A is preferred, because increasing the dimen-
sion of A necessitates compromising more RTUs or communication devices. In the
following section, we present an undetectable attack requiring a small number of
data modifications and prove its optimality for a class of targets by utilizing the
algebraic condition.
3.3.2 State-preserving Attack
This section presents a simple undetectable attack, referred to as state-preserving
attack. As the name suggests, the attack intentionally preserves the state in order
to have a sparse attack vector. We again motivate our result by considering first
the noiseless case.
Noiseless Measurement Case
Given z = Hx ∈ Col(H), the state-preserving attack sets a(z) equal to (H¯ −H)x.
Then, z + a(z) = H¯x ∈ Col(H¯); the attack is undetectable. Note that the state
x remains the same after the attack. Since H has full column rank, a(z) can be
simply calculated as
a(z) = (H¯ −H)x = (H¯ −H)(H tH)−1H tz. (3.7)
For a(z) above to be a valid attack vector, it is necessary to be a sparse vector
constrained by the meters, the data of which can be altered by the adversary.
To see an intuitive reason why H¯x−Hx is sparse, consider the simple case that
a line is removed from the topology while the state is preserved. In this case, the
line flows through all the lines, except the removed line, stay the same. Because,
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the line flow from i to j is determined by (i) (xi, xj) and (ii) whether i and j are
connected, and for most lines, these two factors remain the same. Hence, only few
entries are different between H¯x and Hx. Below, we will show that, for all state
x ∈ Rn, all entries of (H¯ −H)x are zeros except those associated with the target
lines.
As noted in [26], H can be decomposed as H =MBAt, whereM ∈ Rm×l is the
measurement-to-line incidence matrix with l , |E0|, B ∈ Rl×l is a diagonal matrix
with the line susceptances in the diagonal entries, and At ∈ Rl×n is the line-to-bus
incidence matrix. Each column ofM (each row of At) corresponds to a distinct line
in E0. For 1 ≤ j ≤ l, if the jth column of M corresponds to (a, b) ∈ E0, let v+j , a
and v−j , b. Then, M is defined such that Mij = ±1 if the ith meter (the meter
corresponding to the ith row of M) measures (i) the line flow from v±j to v
∓
j or (ii)
the injection at bus v±j ; otherwise, Mij = 0. For A
t, (At)ji = ±1 if v±j = i, and the
line corresponding to the jth row of At (or equivalently the jth column of M) is
connected in G; otherwise, (At)ji = 0. Note that M and B are independent of the
topology, but At does depend on G. Fig. 3.2 provides an example to illustrate the
structures of M , B, and At. Similarly, H¯ is decomposed as H¯ =MBA¯t.
As illustrated in Fig. 3.2, the entries of BAtx ∈ Rl×1 correspond to the line
flows of all the lines in E0 when the state is x and the topology is G. Similarly, BA¯
tx
is the vector of line flows when the state is x and the topology is G¯. Since the states
are the same, the kth entry of BAtx and that of BA¯tx are different only if the
corresponding line is connected in one of G and G¯ while disconnected in the other.
Therefore, (BA¯t − BAt)x has all zero entries except the entries corresponding to
the lines in E¯△E. Specifically, the entry corresponding to (i, j) ∈ E¯ \ E assumes






0     1     1    -1     0
0     0    -1     0    -1
1     0     0     0     0
0     1     0     0     0
0     0     1     0     0
0     0     0     1     0
0     0     0     0     1
At =
0   -1    0
1    0    0
1    0   -1
0    0    0
0    1   -1
B = diag(B13, B21, B24, B32, B34)
(1,3)  (2,1)  (2,4)  (3,2)  (3,4) 



































Figure 3.2: The measurement, line, or bus corresponding to each row or column is
labled. Bus 1 is the slack bus. For the rows of M , i¯ denotes the injection meter at
bus i, and (i, j) the meter for the line flow from i to j.






where m(i,j) is the column vector of M corresponding to (i, j). Note that m(i,j) is
a sparse vector that has nonzero entries only at the rows corresponding to the line
flow meters on the line (i, j) and the injection meters at i and j.
From (3.8), for any state x ∈ Rn, (H¯−H)x is a linear combination of elements
in {m(i,j) : (i, j) ∈ E¯△E}. Hence, the state-preserving attack, which sets a(z) =
(H¯−H)x, modifies at most the line flow meters on the target lines and the injection
meters at the target buses.
We now show in the next two theorems that, under certain conditions, the state-
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preserving attack has the least cost in the sense that it requires the adversary to
modify the smallest number of meter data (i.e., the smallest dimension for A).
Theorem 3.3.3 Assume that (i) the actual and target topologies differ by only
one line, i.e., |E¯△E| = 1, and (ii) every line in E¯, incident5 from or to any target
bus with an injection meter, has at least one line flow meter on it. Then, among
all undetectable attacks, the state-preserving attack modifies the smallest number
of meters, which is the total number of line flow and injection meters located on
the target line and target buses.
Proof: See Section 3.7.
Another scenario that the state-preserving attack has the minimum cost is
when the adversary aims to delete lines from the actual topology.
Theorem 3.3.4 Let G∗ and G¯∗ denote the undirected versions of G and G¯ respec-
tively. Suppose that the adversary aims to remove lines from G, i.e., E¯ ( E, and
the following hold:
Every line in E¯, incident from or to a target bus with an injection meter, has
at least one line flow meter on it.
In G∗, target lines do not form a closed path.
G¯∗ does not include a tree T satisfying the following:
1) (number of nodes in T) ≥ 4, and
2) every node in T is a target bus with an injection meter.
5A line (i, j) is said to be incident from i and incident to j.
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Then, among all undetectable attacks, the state-preserving attack modifies the
smallest number of meters, which is the total number of line flow and injection
meters located on the target lines and target buses.
Proof: See Section 3.7.
Roughly speaking, the assumptions in Theorem 3.3.4 hold when target lines are
far from each other such that there is no big tree in G¯ consisting solely of target
buses.
The main advantage of the state-preserving attack is that by preserving the
system state during the attack, the attack can be launched by perturbing only local
meters around the target lines; hence, only few data entries need to be modified.
Theorem 3.3.3 and Theorem 3.3.4 supports the claim by stating the optimality of
the state-preserving attack under the mild assumptions. The theorems also imply
that the minimum cost of an undetectable attack can be easily characterized if the
target topology satisfies the theorem assumptions.
Noisy Measurement Case
Following the intuition behind the state-preserving attack in the noiseless case, we









The above implies that
(H¯ −H)x ∈M , span{m(i,j) : (i, j) ∈ E¯△E} (3.9)
74
We set a(z) as a minimizer of the J(xˆ)-test statistic6:
a(z) , argmin
d∈M
‖(z+ d)− H¯xˆWLS[z+ d]‖2Σ−1 (3.10)
where xˆWLS[z + d] denotes the WLS state estimate when the topology estimate
is G¯, and z + d is observed at the control center. Note that, since a(z) ∈ M, the
attack with a modifies at most the line flow measurements of the target lines and
the injection measurements of the target buses.
Now, suppose that the adversary modifies breaker state measurements such
that the topology estimate becomes G¯ and simultaneously modifies the meter data
with a(z). Then, the J(xˆ)-test statistic at the control center is upper bounded as
‖(z+ a(z))− H¯xˆWLS[z+ a(z)]‖2Σ−1
≤ ‖(H¯x+ e)− H¯xˆWLS[H¯x+ e]‖2Σ−1 ,
because (H¯−H)x is an element ofM. Note that the right hand side is the J(xˆ)-test
statistic when the meter data are consistent with the topology estimate G¯. Hence,
it has χ2m−n distribution, the same as the distribution of the J(xˆ)-test statistic
under the absence of bad data [40]. This argument leads to the following theorem
stating that this attack is undetectable.
Theorem 3.3.5 The state-preserving attack a, defined in (3.10), is undetectable.
Note that xˆWLS[z + d] in (3.10) is a linear function of z + d, so a(z) can be
obtained as a linear weighted least squares solution. Specifically, a(z) has a form
of a(z) = Dz where D ∈ Rm×m depends on G, G¯, and Σ, but not on z. Hence, D
can be obtained off-line before observing z.
6We use ‖r‖2Σ−1 to denote the quadratic form rtΣ−1r.
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Note also that the state-preserving attacks in the noiseless and noisy cases
modify the same set of meters. In addition, recall that the condition for existence
of an undetectable attack is the same for both noiseless and noisy cases. The
optimality statements for the state-preserving attack in Theorem 3.3.3 and Theo-
rem 3.3.4 were derived purely based on the condition for undetectability. Hence,
the same optimality statements hold for the noisy measurement case, as stated in
the following corollary, and the same interpretation can be made.
Corollary 3.3.5.1 For the noisy measurement DC model, suppose that the con-
dition in Theorem 3.3.3 or the condition in Theorem 3.3.4 hold. Then, among all
undetectable attacks, the state-preserving attack modifies the smallest number of
meters, which is the total number of line flow and injection meters located on the
target lines and target buses.
3.4 Topology Attack with Local Information
In this section, we consider the more realistic scenario of a weak attacker who
does not have the measurement data of the entire network; it only has access
to a few meters. The information available to the adversary is local. We also
generalize the linear (DC) measurement model to the nonlinear (AC) model. The
resulting undetectable attacks, however, are limited to line removal attacks, i.e.,
the adversary only tries to remove lines from the actual network topology.
We first consider the noiseless measurement case under the DC model. Since we
are restricted to line-removal attacks, E¯ is a strict subset of E. Therefore, recalling
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(3.8), we have




where fij(x), as defined in Section 3.3, denotes the line flow from i to j when the
line is connected, and the state is x.
Let zij denote the measurement of the line flow from i to j. Due to the absence
of noise, zij = fij(x) = −fji(x) = −zji. With this observation and (3.11), we have










From (3.13), one can see that adding the above a(z) to z is equivalent to the
following heuristic described in Fig. 3.3:
1. For every target line (i, j), subtract zij and zji from the injection measure-
ments at i and j respectively.
2. For every target line (i, j), modify zij and zji to 0.
This heuristic simply forces the line flows through the target lines, which are
disconnected in G¯, to be zeros, while adjusting the injections at the target buses
to satisfy the power balance equations [51]. If a target line (i, j) has only one line
flow meter (e.g., zji), we can use −zji in the place of zij . But, if some target line
has no line flow meter, this heuristic is not applicable. Note that the heuristic
only requires the ability to observe and modify the line flow measurements of the









zj zi − zij
0 0
zj − zji
Figure 3.3: Heuristic Operations Around the Target Line (i, j)
can launch it without knowing the topology or network parameters (i.e., H and H¯
are not necessary). Since the heuristic is equivalent to the state-preserving attack,
it is undetectable.
The same heuristic is applicable to the noisy measurements z = Hx + e.
To avoid detection, the adversary can make a(z) approximate H¯x − Hx such
that z + a(z) is close to H¯x + e. Because zij = fij(x) + eij, zij is an unbi-
ased estimate of fij(x). Similarly, −
∑
(i,j)∈E\E¯ zijm(i,j) is an unbiased estimate of
−∑(i,j)∈E\E¯ fij(x)m(i,j), which is equal to H¯x−Hx. Hence, it is reasonable to set
a(z) = −∑(i,j)∈E\E¯ zijm(i,j) even in the noisy measurement case.
The same idea is applicable to the AC power flow model with the nonlinear
state estimator. Suppose that z is the real power measurement from the AC power
flow model: z = h(x)+e, where x is the vector of the voltage phasors at all buses,
and h is the nonlinear measurement function for G. Let h¯ denote the measurement
function for G¯. If a(z) is equal to h¯(x)− h(x),
z¯ = (h(x) + e) + a(z) = h¯(x) + e, (3.14)
which is consistent with G¯, so the attack cannot be detected. We will show that
the attack vector of the heuristic approximates h¯(x)− h(x).
For simplicity, assume that the attacker aims at removing a single line (i, j)
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from G. Then, h(x) and h¯(x) are different only in the entries corresponding to the
injections at i and j and the line flows through (i, j). Specifically, h¯(x)− h(x) has
all zero entries except −hij(x) at the rows corresponding to the injection at i and
the line flow from i to j, and −hji(x) at the rows corresponding to the injection at j
and the line flow from j to i, where hij(x) denotes the entry of h(x) corresponding
to the line flow from i to j. Since zij = hij(x)+eij and zji = hji(x)+eji, zij and zji
can be considered as unbiased estimates of hij(x) and hji(x) respectively. Hence,
the attacker can use zij and zji to construct an unbiased estimate of h¯(x)− h(x).
Adding this estimate to z is equivalent to the heuristic operation of Fig. 3.3, which
subtracts zij and zji from zi and zj respectively, and sets zij and zji to zeros. The
same argument holds for the reactive measurement part and multiple-line removal
attacks. In practice, the heuristic attack should be executed twice separately,
once for real measurements and second for reactive measurements. In Section 3.6,
numerical simulations demonstrate that the heuristic attack on the AC power flow
model with the nonlinear state estimation has a very low detection probability.
3.5 Countermeasure for Topology Attacks
In this section, we consider countermeasures that prevent attacks by a strong ad-
versary with global information. In particular, we assume that a subset of meters
can be secured so that the adversary cannot modify data from these meters. In
practice, this can be accomplished by implementing more sophisticated authenti-
cation protocols. We present a so-called cover-up protection that identifies the set
of meters that need to be secured.
The algebraic condition in Theorems 3.3.1-3.3.2 provides a way to check
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whether a set of adversary-controlled meters is enough to launch an undetectable
attack. Restating the algebraic condition, there exists an undetectable attack with
the subspace A of feasible attack vectors, if and only if Col(H) ⊂ Col(H¯, A) for
some G¯ (different from G).
Let IS denote the set of indices for the entries of z corresponding to the pro-
tected meters. Then, A is {c ∈ Rm : ci = 0, i ∈ IS}. The objective of the control
center is to make any undetectable attack infeasible while minimizing the cost of
protection (i.e., minimizing |IS| or equivalently, maximizing the dimension of A).
To achieve the protection goal, A should satisfy that for any target topology
G¯, Col(H) * Col(H¯, A). However, finding such A by checking the conditions for
all possible targets is computationally infeasible. To avoid computational burden,
the following theorem gives a simple graph-theoretical strategy.
Theorem 3.5.1 (Cover-up strategy) Let E˜ and E˜0 denote the undirected coun-
terparts of E and E0 respectively. For i ∈ V, let Li denote the set of edges in (V, E˜0)
that are incident to i.
Suppose there is a spanning tree T = (V,ET) of (V, E˜) (the current topology)
and a vertex subset B (B ⊂ V) that satisfies
ET ∪ (∪b∈BLb) = E˜0. (3.15)
Then, if we protect (i) one line flow meter for each line in ET and (ii) the
injection meters at all buses in B, an undetectable attack does not exist for any
target topology.
Proof: See Section 3.7.
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The condition (3.15) means that the edges of T and the edges incident to vertices
in B can cover all the lines (both connected and disconnected) of the grid. One
can easily find such T and B using available graph algorithms.
Fig. 3.4 describes a cover-up strategy for IEEE 14-bus system. The strategy
used the spanning tree T marked by red dash lines, and B = {1, 4, 13}. The
unprotected meters and protected meters are marked by black rectangles and blue
circles respectively. In this example, the strategy requires protection of 30% of
meters. In addition, numerically checking the algebraic condition showed that if
the control center removes any of the protections, the grid becomes vulnerable to
undetectable topology attacks. This suggests that the strategy does not require
protection of an excessive number of meters. For IEEE 118-bus system, a cover-up
strategy required protection of 31% of meters.
The cover-up strategy also prevents undetectable state attacks [18]. It follows
from Theorem 1 in [24], which states that an undetectable state attack does not
exist if and only if the secure meters, protected by the control center, make the
system state observable. Because the strategy protects one line meter for each line
in the spanning tree T, the system state is always observable with the protected
meters [26].
3.6 Numerical Results
We first present practical uses of the algebraic condition for undetectable attacks.
Then, we test the proposed attacks with IEEE 14-bus and 118-bus systems, and
present their effect on real-time LMPs.
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Figure 3.4: Rectangles (or circles) on buses and lines represent injection meters
and line flow meters respectively. We assume that E = E0. The attacker may
attempt to remove lines from G.
3.6.1 Application of Undetectability Condition
In Section 3.3.1, the necessary and sufficient algebraic condition is given to check
whether an adversary can launch an undetectable attack for a target G¯ with a
subspace A of feasible attack vectors. Here, we provide examples of how the
condition can be used by both attackers and the control center.
Suppose that an attacker with global information aims to remove a specific
set of lines from the topology. In Section 3.3.1, we have shown that the state-
preserving attack requires the smallest dimension of A among undetectable attacks
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Table 3.1: The adversary-controlled meters for the attacks to remove lines (2, 4)
and (12, 13): i → j denotes the meter for the line flow from bus i to bus j. i




2→ 4, 4→ 2, 12→ 13,
13→ 12, 2, 4, 12, 13
Alternative 1
(not modifying 12)
2→ 4, 4→ 2, 12→ 13, 13→ 12,
6→ 12, 12→ 6, 2, 4, 6, 13
Alternative 2
(not modifying 4)
2→ 4, 4→ 2, 12→ 13, 13→ 12, 2→ 3,
3→ 2, 3→ 4, 4→ 3, 2, 3, 12, 13
under mild conditions. If the conditions are met and the attacker can perform
the necessary meter modifications, the state-preserving attack can be launched
with the guaranteed optimality. However, if the attacker cannot perform some
meter modification required by the state-preserving attack, it should search for an
undetectable alternative with a reasonably small dimension for A. The algebraic
condition can be used to find such an alternative7. For instance, for a line-removal
attack on the IEEE 14-bus network in Fig. 3.4, Table 3.1 shows some alternatives
to the state-preserving attack when the attacker cannot modify some injection
meter.
When the set of adversary-controlled meters is fixed, the algebraic condition
can be exploited to find the target topologies, for which the attacker can launch
undetectable attacks. For instance, in the IEEE 14-bus network in Fig. 3.4, assume
that the attacker can modify the data from the injection meters at 11, 12, and
7One heuristic way to find an alternative, which we employed, is to begin with a large set K of
adversary-controlled meters that satisfies the algebraic condition and the constraint (e.g., exclude
a certain injection meter) and remove meters from K one by one such that after each removal of
a meter, K still satisfies the algebraic condition. If no more meter can be removed, we take K
as an alternative. The final set depends on the initial K and the sequence of removed elements.
One can try this procedure multiple times with different initial Ks and removal sequences, and
pick the one with the smallest size.
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Table 3.2: The Sets of Lines Undetectable Attacks Can Remove
|E¯△E| E¯△E (lines to be removed by the attack)
1
{(6, 12)}, {(6, 11)}, {(10, 11)}, {(9, 10)},
{(9, 14)}, {(13, 14)}, {(12, 13)}
2
{(10, 11), (13, 14)}, {(9, 14), (12, 13)}, {(9, 10), (13, 14)},
{(6, 12), (13, 14)}, {(6, 12), (10, 11)}, {(6, 12), (9, 10)},
{(6, 11), (12, 13)}, {(6, 11), (9, 14)}
3
{(6, 11), (9, 14), (12, 13)}, {(6, 12), (9, 10), (13, 14)},
{(6, 12), (10, 11), (13, 14)}
14, and all the line flow meters on (6, 12), (6, 11), (10, 11), (9, 10), (9, 14), and
(13, 14). Then, numerically checking the algebraic condition show that the attacker
cannot launch an undetectable attack for any target. However, if the attacker can
additionally control the line flow meters on (12, 13), it can launch an undetectable
attack to remove any set of lines listed in Table 3.2 from the current topology.
The control center can also utilize the algebraic condition to decide which me-
ters to put more security measures on. For instance, in the IEEE 14-bus network,
suppose that the control center protects all the injection meter. In the worst
case, the attacker may be able to modify all the line flow measurements. In this
case, checking the algebraic condition shows that the attacker can launch an un-
detectable line-removal attack for any target topology, as long as the system with
the target topology is observable. However, checking the algebraic condition also
shows that if the control center can additionally protect any line flow meter, an
undetectable attack does not exist for any target. Therefore, it is worthwhile for
the control center to make an effort to secure one more line flow meter.
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3.6.2 Undetectability and Effects on Real-time LMP
We tested the state-preserving attack with global information and the heuristic
with local information on IEEE 14-bus and IEEE 118-bus system, and investigated
their effect on real-time LMPs. The AC power flow model and nonlinear state
estimation were used to emulate the real-world power grid.
For simulations, we first assigned the line capacities, generation limits, and
estimated loads, and obtained the day-ahead dispatch. Then, we modeled the
voltage magnitudes and phases of buses as Gaussian random variables centered
at the system state for the day-ahead dispatch, with small variances. In each
Monte Carlo run, we generated a state vector from the distribution and used the
nonlinear AC power flow model8 with Gaussian measurement noise to generate
the noisy measurements. The attacker observed the noisy measurements, added
the corresponding attack vector to them, and passed the corrupt measurements
to the control center. The control center employed the nonlinear state estimator
to obtain the residue and performed the J(xˆ)-test with the residue. If J(xˆ)-test
failed to detect the attack, the real-time LMPs were calculated based on the state
estimate.
In simulations, we assumed that the attacker aims to remove a single line from
the topology. Fig. 3.5 presents the detection probability of the proposed attacks
on IEEE 14-bus system, for different target lines. The attacks on most target
lines succeeded with low detection probabilities, close to the false alarm constraint
0.1. Table 3.3 shows the detection probability averaged over all possible single-line
8In simulations, we have reactive measurements, which were not considered in our analysis of
the state-preserving attack. We simply applied the same analysis for the reactive components of
the linearlized decoupled model [51] and derived the reactive counterpart of the state-preserving
attack.
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Figure 3.5: The x-axis is for the index of the target line. Measurement noise
standard deviation is 0.5 p.u., and 1000 Monte Carlo runs are used.
Table 3.3: 1000 Monte Carlo runs are used.
14-bus 118-bus
false alarm const. α α = 0.1 α = 0.01 α = 0.1 α = 0.01
state-preserving 0.061 0.009 0.075 0.005
heuristic 0.105 0.019 0.095 0.009
removal attacks. In both IEEE 14-bus and 118-bus systems, the proposed attacks
were hardly detected. In most cases, detection probabilities were as low as the false
alarm rates. The performance of the heuristic was remarkably good, considering
that it only requires to observe and control few local data.
We also examined the absolute perturbation of the real-time LMPs (see [36]
for real-time LMP). The parameters in the real-time LMP calculation include the
estimated set of congested lines and the shift-factor matrix; both depend on the
topology estimate. Hence, we expect that topology attacks would disturb the real-
time LMP calculation. In our simulations, both the state-preserving attack and
the heuristic perturbed the real-time LMPs by 10% on average for IEEE 14-bus
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system and 3.3% for IEEE 118-bus system. In the 118-bus system, attacks on
some target lines had effects on only the buses near the target lines, so the average
perturbation was lower than the 14-bus case.
3.7 Proofs
3.7.1 Proof of Theorem 3.3.2
The if statement can be proved by constructing an undetectable attack following
the arguments used to prove Theorem 3.3.1 and Theorem 3.3.5. Due to the space
limit, we only provide the proof of the only if statement.
Let a be any attack with Col(H) * Col(H¯, U) where U , {u1, . . . , uK} denotes
the basis of A consisting of unit vectors in Rm and U ∈ Rm×K is the matrix having
the vectors in U as its columns. Without loss of generality, we assume that the
columns of H¯ and the unit vectors in U are linearly independent; if not, we can
just work with a smaller set of U satisfying the independence condition.
Because Col(H) * Col(H¯, U), Col(H)∩Col(H¯, U) is a subspace of Col(H) with
a strictly smaller dimension. Hence, S , {x ∈ Rn : Hx ∈ Col(H) ∩ Col(H¯, U)}
has the dimension less than n and thus a zero Lebesgue measure in Rn. Let x be
an arbitrary element of Rn \ S. Then, y , Hx /∈ Col(H¯, U). When x is the true
state, z = y + e, and the J(xˆ)-test statistic for a is
J = ‖W (y + e+ a(y + e))‖Σ−1











The minimization in L is achieved by the linear WLS solution, and one
can show that L = (Wˆ (y + e))tΣ−1Wˆ (y + e) where Wˆ , W −
(WU)[(WU)tΣ−1(WU)]−1(WU)tΣ−1W . W and Wˆ are idempotent and Σ−1W
is symmetric. Using these properties, one may derive that
L = (Σ−
1






2 (y + e)).





and symmetric, (ii) Σ−
1
2 (y + e) ∼ N (Σ− 12y, Im), and (iii) rank(Σ 12 Wˆ tΣ− 12 ) =
m− n−K. With these three properties, Theorem B.33 and Theorem 1.3.3 in [75]
imply that L has the noncentral chi-squared distribution with the (m − n − K)
degree of freedom and the noncentral parameter λ , (Wˆy)tΣ−1(Wˆy).
It can be shown that y /∈ Col(H¯, U) implies Wˆy 6= 0. Hence, if the diagonal





i grows to infinity. Suppose that the J(xˆ)-test uses a threshold τ .
The detection probability of the attack is Pr(J > τ), and it is lower bounded by
Pr(L > τ). And, Pr(L > τ) approaches 1 as the noncentral parameter λ grows
to infinity. Therefore, if the diagonal entries of Σ (i.e., noise variances) uniformly
decreases to 0, then λ grows to infinity and Pr(J > τ) approaches 1. Hence, the
only if statement and the additional statement are proved.
3.7.2 Proof of Theorem 3.3.3
Let E¯△E = {(a, b)}. We prove the statement for the case that the attack removes
(a, b), and there are two line flow meters on (a, b) (one for each direction) and
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injection meters at both a and b. For the line addition attack and other meter
availabilities, the similar argument can be made.
Suppose there exists an undetectable attack with A, and let U = {u1, . . . , uK}
denote the basis of A consisting of unit vectors in Rm. Theorem 3.3.1 implies
Col(H) ⊂ Col(H¯, A). It can be easily verified that m(a,b) ∈ Col(H¯, A), and this
implies m(a,b) = H¯x +
∑K
k=1 αkuk for some x ∈ Rn and (αk)Kk=1 ∈ RK . Then,
m¯ ,m(a,b) −
∑K
k=1 αkuk ∈ Col(H¯).
Let m¯ij (m¯i) denote the row entry of m¯ corresponding to the line flow from i to
j (the injection at i) and u(i,j) (u(i)) denote the m-dimensional unit vector with 1
at the row corresponding to the line flow from i to j (the injection at i). Physically,
m¯ ∈ Col(H¯) means that m¯ is a vector of meter data consistent with the topology
G¯. It implies that (i) m¯ab and m¯ba are zeros, since (a, b) is disconnected in G¯, and
(ii) the Kirchhoff’s current laws (KCL) should hold at bus a and b in G¯, i.e., the
sum of all outgoing line flows from a should be equal to the injection amount at
a. Using the special structure of m(a,b) and m¯, the following can be proved. From
(i), one can prove that u(a,b), u(b,a) ∈ U. From (ii), one can show that U should
include u(a) or some u(a,k) (or u(k,a)) with a and k connected in G. Similarly, U
should include u(b) or some u(b,l) (or u(l,b)) with b and l connected in G. Hence, |U|
is no less than the total number of meters located on the target line (a, b) and the
target buses a and b.
3.7.3 Proof of Theorem 3.3.4
Suppose a is an undetectable attack with A for the target topology G¯ satisfying
the theorem conditions. Let U = {u1, . . . , uK} be the basis of A consisting of unit
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vectors in Rm, and J ⊂ V denote the set of target buses with injection meters.
For ease of presentation, we assume that each target line (i, j) has two line flow
meters, one for each direction. For other meter availabilities, the similar argument
can be made.
Theorem 3.3.1 implies that Col(H) ⊂ Col(H¯, U). It can be easily shown that if
the target lines do not form a closed path in G, then Col(H) ⊂ Col(H¯, U) implies
that m(i,j) ∈ Col(H¯, U) for all target lines (i, j) ∈ E \ E¯.
m(i,j) ∈ Col(H¯, U) means that it is possible to find a linear combination of
vectors in U,
∑K
k=1 αkuk, such that m¯(i,j) ,m(i,j)+
∑K
k=1 αkuk ∈ Col(H¯). m¯(i,j) ∈
Col(H¯) implies that (i) the row entries of m¯(i,j) corresponding to the line flows of
the disconnected lines in G¯ are zeros, and (ii) the entries of m¯(i,j) satisfy KCLs at
all buses in G¯.
For each (i, j) ∈ E \ E¯, since (i, j) is disconnected in G¯, m¯ij(i,j) = m¯ji(i,j) = 0. On
the other hand, mij(i,j) = 1 and m
ji
(i,j) = −1. Hence, U should include u(i,j) and
u(j,i). Therefore, U should contain {u(i,j),u(j,i) : (i, j) ∈ E \ E¯}.
For each i ∈ J, the assumptions imply that each line adjacent to i in G¯ has at
least one line flow meter. We let ni denote the set of the line flow meters on the
lines incident to i in G¯, and mni(i,j) denote the vector of the corresponding entries in
m(i,j). Because m(i,j) has nonzero entries only for the injections at i and j and the
line flows through (i, j), mni(i,j) has all zero entries. On the other hand, m
i
(i,j) = 1.
Hence, for m¯(i,j) to satisfy the KCL at bus i in G¯, at least one of m
i
(i,j) or entries
of mni(i,j) has to be modified by
∑K
k=1 αkuk. Thus, U should contain u(i) or u(a,b)
for some (a, b) ∈ ni.
In case that u(i) /∈ U, for m¯(i,j) to satisfy the KCL at bus i in G¯, at least one
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entry of m¯ni(i,j) should have a nonzero value: suppose m¯
ik
(i,j) takes a nonzero value.
If k ∈ J, we can make a similar argument based on the KCL at k: U should contain
u(k) or u(a,b) for some (a, b) ∈ n(k)\{(i, k), (k, i)}. Following this line of argument,
we can derive that for each i ∈ J, U should contain unit vectors corresponding
to at least one of the following sets: (i) injection meter at i, (ii) line flow meters
on all the lines in some path (i, v2, . . . , vn) in G¯
∗ and injection meter at vn where
v2, . . . , vn ∈ J, or (iii) line flow meters on all the lines in some path (i, v2, . . . , vn)
in G¯∗ where v2, . . . , vn−1 ∈ J and vn is either equal to one of {v2, . . . , vn−1} or not
in J. For each i ∈ J, U should contain at least one set of unit vectors corresponding
to any of the above three cases: we let Si to denote an arbitrary one of such sets.
Note that {u(i,j),u(j,i) : (i, j) ∈ E \ E¯} does not overlap with ∪i∈JSi. Hence,
|U| ≥ | ∪i∈J Si| + |{u(i,j),u(j,i) : (i, j) ∈ E \ E¯}|. Proving | ∪i∈J Si| ≥ |J| gives us
the theorem statement, because |J| + |{u(i,j),u(j,i) : (i, j) ∈ E \ E¯}| is the exact
number of meters the state-preserving attack modifies.
We will prove the following statement for all n ≤ |J|, by mathematical induc-
tion: for any subset J¯ ⊂ J with |J¯| = n, | ∪i∈J¯ Si| ≥ n. For n = 1, 2, 3, the
statement can be easily verified. Suppose the statement is true for all n ≤ k
(k ≥ 3), and J¯ is an arbitrary subset of J with |J¯| = k + 1. The tree con-
dition guarantees that J¯ can be partitioned into two nonempty sets J¯1 and J¯2
such that for any b1 ∈ J¯1 and b2 ∈ J¯2, every path in G¯∗ between b1 and b2 con-
tains a node not in J. This implies that ∪b∈J¯1Sb and ∪b∈J¯2Sb are disjoint. By
the induction hypothesis, we have | ∪b∈J¯1 Sb| ≥ |J¯1| and | ∪b∈J¯2 Sb| ≥ |J¯2|. Thus,
| ∪b∈J¯ Sb| = | ∪b∈J¯1 Sb| + | ∪b∈J¯2 Sb| ≥ |J¯1| + |J¯2| = |J¯|. Therefore, the induction
implies | ∪i∈J Si| ≥ |J|, and the theorem statement follows.
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3.7.4 Proof of Theorem 3.5.1
Suppose meters are protected as described with T and B. Let A be the resulting
subspace of feasible attack vectors and U , {u1, . . . , uK} denote the basis of A
consisting of unit vectors in Rm. Assume that an undetectable attack can be
launched for some target topology G¯ (different from G). We will show that this
assumption leads to a contradiction.
Note that U cannot contain the unit vectors corresponding to the protected
measurements. In addition, Theorem 3.3.2 implies that Col(H) ⊂ Col(H¯, U).
These two imply that the lines in ET cannot be removed by the attack, because
each line has a protected line flow meter.
Let Ĥ ( ̂¯H) denote the submatrix of H (H¯) obtained by selecting the rows
corresponding to the protected meter measurements. One can easily verify that
Col(H) ⊂ Col(H¯, U) if and only if Col(Ĥ) ⊂ Col( ̂¯H). Hence, we have Col(Ĥ) ⊂
Col( ̂¯H). This means that for all x ∈ Rn, there exists y ∈ Rn such that ̂¯Hy = Ĥx.
Let HT denote the submatrix of Ĥ obtained by selecting the rows corresponding
to the protected line flow meters on the spanning tree T. Since the lines in ET
cannot be removed by the attack, the HT part of H remains the same in H¯; hence,
HT is also a submatrix of
̂¯H. Thus, ̂¯Hy = Ĥx implies HTy = HTx. Since T is
a spanning tree and it has one protected line flow meter per line, the protected
line meters on T makes the grid observable [26]. Hence, HT has full column rank.
Consequently, HTy = HTx implies y = x, and we have
̂¯Hx = Ĥx. This holds for
all x ∈ Rn.
Let a be any element in B. We will show that any line in La cannot be a
target line. Note that the injection meter at a is protected, so Ĥ and ̂¯H have
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the row corresponding to the injection at a. ̂¯Hx = Ĥx for all x ∈ Rn implies
that the injection at bus a should be the same for G and G¯ as long as the state
is the same for the two cases. When the state is x, the injection at a in G is∑






Bak(xa − xk) =
∑
l:{a,l}∈˜¯E
Bal(xa − xl), ∀x ∈ Rn,






Bal(xa − xl) = 0.
If La ∩ (˜¯E△E˜) is not empty, the above statement is true only when Bak = 0
for all {a, k} ∈ La ∩ (˜¯E△E˜). Bak is the susceptance of the line {a, k} when it is
“connected”, and this value is nonzero in practice for every line. Hence, La∩(˜¯E△E˜)
should be empty; i.e., a line in La cannot be a target line.
It was shown that the lines in T and ∪a∈BLa cannot be a target line. Thus, the
condition (3.15) implies that no line can be a target line, and this contradicts the
assumption that there exists an undetectable topology attack.
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CHAPTER 4
DATA FRAMING ATTACK ON STATE ESTIMATION
4.1 Introduction
A promising feature of a future smart grid is the data-driven approach to auto-
mated monitoring, control, and decision. The paradigm shift to a data-driven
framework enables deeper integration of data collection and sophisticated data
processing. While extracting actionable information from real-time sensing data
can make the grid more efficient and adaptive to real-time operating conditions, it
exposes the grid to possible cyber data attacks aimed at disrupting grid operations
and potentially causes blackouts.
In [18], Liu, Ning, and Reiter presented perhaps the first man-in-the-middle
(MiM) attack on the power system state estimation where an adversary replaces
“normal” sensor data with “malicious data.” It was shown that, if the adversary
could gain control of a sufficient number of meters, it could perturb the state
estimate by an arbitrary amount without being detected by the bad data detector
employed at the control center. Such undetectable attacks are referred to as covert
data attacks.
The condition under which covert data attacks are possible is found to be
equivalent to that of system observability. In particular, covert attacks are possible
if and only if the system becomes unobservable when the meters under attack
are removed [24] (or equivalently, the adversary controls a critical set of meters.)
Therefore, the minimum number of meters that an adversary has to control in
order to launch a covert data attack, referred to as a security index, is an important
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measure of security against data attack. It represents a fundamental limit on the
capability of an adversary to disrupt covertly the operation of the grid [20, 24].
In this chapter, we show that the barrier on the capability of an adversary
can be circumvented by using a different form of attacks, one that exploits the
vulnerabilities of the existing bad data detection and removal mechanisms. In
particular, we show that the adversary only needs to gain control of about half of
the meters required by the security index while achieving the same objective of
perturbing the state estimate by an arbitrary amount without being detected by
the control center.
The attacks considered in this chapter are referred to as data framing attacks,
borrowing the notion of framing as providing false evidence to make someone
innocent appear to be guilty of misconducts. In the context of state estimation,
a data framing attack means that an adversary launches a data attack in such a
way that the control center detects the presence of bad data and identifies normal
meters as sources of bad data. To this end, the attacker does not try to make
malicious data pass the bad data detection (as a covert attack tries to do). Instead,
it purposely triggers the bad data detection and causes erroneous removal of good
data. Unknown to the control center, the remaining data still contain adversary-
injected malicious data, causing errors in the state estimate.
4.1.1 Summary of Results and Organization
We propose a data framing attack on power system state estimation. Specifi-
cally, we formulate the design of optimal data framing attack as a quadratically
constrained quadratic program (QCQP). To analyze the efficacy of the data fram-
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ing attack, we present a sufficient condition under which the framing attack can
achieve an arbitrary perturbation of the state estimate by controlling only half
of the critical set of meters. We demonstrate with the IEEE 14-bus and 118-bus
networks that the sufficient condition holds in critical sets associated with cuts.
The optimal design of framing attack is based on a linearized system. In prac-
tice, a nonlinear state estimator is often used. We demonstrate that, under the
nonlinear measurement model, the framing attacks designed based on linearized
system model successfully perturb the state estimate, and the adversary can con-
trol the degree of perturbation as desired.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the
measurement and adversary models with preliminaries on state attacks. Section 4.3
presents the mathematical model of state estimation and bad data processing. In
Section 4.4, we present the main idea of the data framing attack and the QCQP
framework for the attack design. Section 4.5 provides a theoretical justification of
the efficacy of the data framing attack. In Section 4.6, we test the data framing
attack with the IEEE 14-bus and 118-bus networks.
4.2 Mathematical Models
This section introduces the topology and system state of a power network, the
meter measurement model, and the adversary model. In addition, the covert state
attack and its connection with network observability are explained. Throughout
the chapter, boldface lower case letters (e.g.,x) denote vectors, xi denotes the ith
entry of the vector x, boldface upper case letters (e.g.,H) denote matrices, Hij
denotes the (i, j) entry of H, R(H) denotes the column space of H, N(H) denotes
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the null space of H, and script letters (e.g., I,A) denote sets. The multivariate
normal distribution with the mean µ and the covariance matrix Σ is denoted by
N (µ,Σ).
4.2.1 Network and Measurement Models
A power network is a network of buses connected by transmission lines, and thus
the topology of the grid can be naturally defined as an undirected graph G = (V,E)
where V is the set of buses, and E is the set of lines connecting buses ({i, j} ∈ E if
and only if bus i and bus j are connected.) The system state of the power network
is defined as the vector of bus voltage magnitudes and phase angles, from which
all the other quantities (e.g., power line flows, power injections, line currents) can
be calculated.
For real-time estimation of the system state, the control center collects mea-
surements from line flow and bus injection meters1 deployed throughout the grid.
The meter measurements are related to the system state x in a nonlinear fashion,
and the relation is described by the AC model [51]:
z = h(x) + e, (4.1)
where h(·) is the nonlinear measurement function, and e is the Gaussian measure-
ment noise with a diagonal covariance matrix.
If some of the meters malfunction or an adversary injects malicious data, the
control center observes biased measurements,
z¯ = h(x) + e+ a, (4.2)
1Other types of meters can also be considered, but we restrict our attention to line flow and
bus injection meters for simplicity.
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where a represents a deterministic bias. In such a case, the data are said to be
bad, and the biased meter entries are referred to as bad data entries. Note that
even when a meter is protected from adversarial modification, it may still have a
bias due to a physical malfunction or improper parameter setting; filtering out the
measurements from such malfunctioning meters was the original objective of the
legacy bad data processing and is adopted in practice today [40].
Even though the model in (4.1) is nonlinear, the state estimate is generally
obtained by iterations of weighted linear least squares estimation with the locally
linearized model [51]. Therefore, it is reasonable to analyze the performance of
state estimation using the locally linearized model around the system operating
point. To this end, in analyzing the attack effect on state estimation, we adopt the
so-called DC model [51]. In the DC model, for the ease of analysis, the AC model
(4.1) is linearized around the system state where all voltage phasors are equal to
1∠0, and only real part of the measurements are retained:
z = Hx+ e, (4.3)
where z ∈ Rm is the measurement vector consisting of real part of line flow and bus
injection measurements, the system state x ∈ Rn is the vector of voltage phase
angles at all buses except the reference bus (x is unknown, but deterministic),
H ∈ Rm×n is the DC measurement matrix that relates the system state to bus
injection and line flow amounts, and e is the Gaussian measurement noise with
a diagonal covariance matrix Σ. We represent the noise covariance matrix Σ
as Σ = σ2Σ¯, where Σ¯ is a diagonal matrix representing the variation of noise
variances across different meters (
∑m
i=1 Σ¯ii = 1), and σ
2 is a scaling factor.
Each row of H has a special structure depending on the type of the meter [51].
For ease of presentation, consider the noiseless measurement z = Hx. If an entry
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zk of z is the measurement of the line flow from bus i to bus j, zk is Bij(xi − xj)
where Bij is the line susceptance and xi is the voltage phase angle at bus i [51].
If zk is the measurement of bus injection at i, it is the sum of all the outgoing
line flows from i, and the corresponding row of H is the sum of the row vectors
corresponding to all the outgoing line flows.
The analysis based on the DC model needs to be verified using the realistic
AC model simulations; we demonstrate in Section 4.6 that the proposed attack
strategy is also effective in the AC model simulations.
4.2.2 Adversary Model
We consider a man-in-the-middle attack on power system state estimation. As
described in Fig. 4.1, an adversary is assumed to be capable of modifying the data
from a subset of analog meters IA. We refer to the meters in IA as adversary
meters.
The control center observes the corrupted measurements z¯ instead of the orig-
inal measurements z in (4.1). We assume that the adversary knows the line pa-
rameters (i.e., the measurement function h and the measurement matrix H).
The adversarial modification is mathematically modeled as follows:
z¯ = z+ a, a ∈ A, (4.4)
where a is an attack vector, and A is the set of feasible attack vectors defined as
A , {c ∈ Rm : ci = 0, ∀i /∈ Ia}. Note that A fully characterizes the ability of the
adversary. In addition, the adversary is assumed to design a without observing
any entry of z, i.e., the attack does not require any real-time observation.
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4.2.3 Network Observability and Covert State Attack
For state estimation to be feasible, the control center needs to have enough meter
measurements, from which the system state can be uniquely determined. Formally,
a power network is said to be locally observable at a state x0 if the system state
can be uniquely determined from the noiseless meter measurements h(x) in a
neighborhood of x0. This implies that the Jacobian of h at x0 has full rank.
However, due to the intractability of checking local observability for all feasible
operating points, the DC model (4.3) is generally adopted for observability analysis
[26]: the network is said to be observable if the DC measurement matrix H has
full rank. In practice, power networks should be designed to satisfy observability.
Hence, we assume that the network of our interest is observable (i.e., H has full
rank.)
The concept of network observability is closely related to the feasibility of a
covert state attack. The covert state attack was proposed in [18] under the DC
model: if there exists y ∈ Rn \ {0} such that Hy ∈ A, then setting a equal to Hy
results in
z¯ = Hx+ e+ a = H(x+ y) + e, (4.5)
and thus, z¯ cannot be distinguished from a normal noisy measurement vector with
the state x+ y. Furthermore, by properly scaling the attack vector (e.g., αa), the
adversary can perturb the state estimate by an arbitrary degree (e.g., αy).
It is shown in [24] that a covert attack is feasible if and only if the adversary
can control a critical set of meters, which is defined as a set of meters such that re-
moving the set from the network renders the network unobservable while removing
any proper subset of it does not [51]. Hence, the feasibility condition means that















Figure 4.1: Adversary model with state estimation and bad data test
The intuition behind the condition is that, for any y ∈ Rn \{0}, Hy is in A if and
only if Hy has zero entries for all non-adversary meters; the latter implies that the
measurement matrix after the removal of the rows corresponding to the adversary
meters is rank deficient, because y is in its null space.
4.3 State Estimation and Bad Data Processing
This section introduces a popular approach of state estimation and bad data pro-
cessing, which we assume to be employed by the control center. Once the control
center receives the measurements z, it aims to obtain the estimate xˆ of the system
state x. Because bad data entries in z may result in a bias in the state estimate,
the control center iteratively conducts state estimation and bad data detection and
identification to filter out possible bad data entries in z.
Fig. 4.1 illustrates an iterative scheme for obtaining xˆ, which consists of three
function blocks: State Estimation, Bad Data Detection, and Bad Data Identifi-
cation [40, 51]. The iteration begins with the initial measurement vector z(1) , z
and the initial measurement function h(1) , h where the superscript denotes the
index for the current iteration. In each iteration, (i) the state estimate is obtained
(State Estimation), (ii) presence of bad data is tested (Bad Data Detection), and
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Table 4.1: State estimation and bad data processing
Bad-Data-Processing(z, h,Σ)
1: z(1) ← z; h(1) ← h; k ← 1;
2: while (true)
3: (xˆ(k), r(k))← State-Estimation(z(k), h(k));
4: result← Bad-Data-Detection(r(k));
5: if result == good
6: break;
7: else
8: (z(k+1), h(k+1))← Bad-Data-ID(r(k), z(k), h(k));
9: end
10: k ← k + 1;
11: end
12: return xˆ(k);
(iii) if data are declared to be bad, one data entry is identified as bad and removed
from the measurement vector (Bad Data Identification). Table 4.1 provides the
pseudocode for the overall procedure. In the following subsections, the detailed
operation of each function block will be presented.
4.3.1 State Estimation and Bad Data Detection
In the kth iteration, State Estimation uses (z(k), h(k)) as an input, and obtains the
weighted least squares (WLS) estimate of the system state:
xˆ(k) , argmin
x
(z(k) − h(k)(x))T (Σ(k))−1(z(k) − h(k)(x)), (4.6)
where Σ(k) is the covariance matrix of the corresponding noise vector. Based on
the state estimate, the residue vector is also evaluated:
r(k) , z(k) − h(k)(xˆ(k)). (4.7)
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We assume that the J(xˆ)-test [40,51] is employed for bad data detection: Bad
Data Detection makes a decision based on the sum of weighted squared residues: bad data if (r
(k))T (Σ(k))−1r(k) > τ (k);
good data if (r(k))T (Σ(k))−1r(k) ≤ τ (k).
(4.8)
The J(xˆ)-test is widely used due to its low complexity and the fact that the test
statistic has a χ2 distribution if the data are good [40]. The latter fact is used to
set the threshold τ (k) for a given false alarm constraint.
4.3.2 Iterative Bad Data Identification and Removal
If Bad Data Detection (4.8) declares that the data are good, the algorithm returns
the state estimate xˆ(k) and terminates. However, if Bad Data Detection declares
that the data are bad, Bad Data Identification is invoked to identify and remove
one bad data entry from the measurement vector.
A widely used criterion for identifying a bad data entry is the normalized
residue [40, 51], which is considered one of the most reliable criteria [41]. In the
normalized residue analysis, each r
(k)
i is divided by its standard deviation under the
good data hypothesis (i.e., the standard deviation of r
(k)
i when there exists no bad
data entry in z(k).) If there exists no bad data entry in z(k), and the state estimate
xˆ(k) is close to the actual state x, the distribution of r(k) can be approximated by
N (0,W(k)Σ(k)) where
W(k) , I−H(k)((H(k))T (Σ(k))−1(H(k)))−1(H(k))T (Σ(k))−1 (4.9)
with H(k) denoting the Jacobian of h(k) at xˆ(k) and I denoting the identity ma-
trix with the appropriate size (see Appendix of [40] for the detail.) Hence, the
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normalized residue is calculated as
r˜(k) = Ω(k)r(k), (4.10)










Once the normalized residue r˜(k) is calculated, the meter with the largest |r˜(k)i |
is identified as a bad meter. Bad Data Identification removes the row of z(k)
and the row of h(k) that correspond to the bad meter and returns the updated
measurement vector and measurement function for the next iteration, denoted by
z(k+1) and h(k+1).
Under the DC model (4.3), State Estimation, Bad Data Detection, and Bad
Data Identification are the same with that in the AC model, except that the
nonlinear measurement function h(k)(x) is replaced with the linear function H(k)x
(so, the Jacobian is the same everywhere.) Note that the WLS state estimate (4.6)
is replaced with a simple linear WLS solution:




r(k) = z(k) −H(k)xˆ(k) =W(k)z(k). (4.13)
2If {i} is a critical set (i.e., removing the meter i makes the grid unobservable), its residue is
always equal to zero [51], and the corresponding diagonal entry of W(k)Σ(k) is zero. For such a
meter, the normalizing factor is 0 such that its normalized residue is equal to 0.
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4.4 Data Framing Attack
This section presents a new attack strategy on state estimation, referred to as
data framing attack, which exploits the bad data processing to remove data from
some normally operating meters and make the adversary meters appear to be
trustworthy. We present the main idea and the QCQP framework for the optimal
design of the attack.
We focus our attention to the case where the adversary cannot control enough
meters to launch a covert attack. The set of normal meters that the framing
attack aims to remove (i.e., frame as bad meters) is referred to as the target set,
denoted by IT. The target set IT is chosen such that after the target meters are
removed from the grid, a covert attack becomes feasible. For instance, suppose
that I is a critical set. The feasibility condition of the covert attack, explained in
Section 4.2.3, implies that if I \ IA is removed from the grid, then the adversary
with IA can launch a covert state attack, because further removing all the meters
in IA makes the grid unobservable. Therefore, I \ IA can be set as the target set
IT.
The resulting state perturbation by the framing attack does depend on the
choice of the target set. Finding the optimal target set for a given attack objective
is certainly an important problem. However, it is out of scope of this chapter. We
focus on the design of the attack vector for a fixed target set.
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4.4.1 Effect of Attack on Normalized Residues
To analyze how the attack affects the bad data processing, we analyze, under the
DC model (4.3), the adversarial effect on the normalized residue vector in the first
iteration. In this subsection, we omit the superscript to simplify notation: all
the quantities we consider are associated with the first iteration unless otherwise
specified.
Suppose that z is the measurement vector without bad data under the DC
model (4.3). The normalized residue in the first iteration is obtained as
r˜ = Ωr = ΩWz, (4.14)
where Ω = Ω(1) is defined as in (4.11).
Due to the normalization, each entry r˜i is distributed as N (0, 1) unless {i} is
a critical set [51]; if {i} is a critical set, the normalized residue for the meter i is
always equal to zero for any z.
If an attack vector a is added, the resulting normalized residue is
r˜ = ΩW(z+ a) = ΩWz+ΩWa. (4.15)
Thus, if {i} is not a critical set, r˜i is distributed as N ((ΩWa)i, 1); if {i} is critical,
r˜i = (ΩWa)i surely.
Recalling that the absolute normalized residues (i.e., |r˜i|) are the statistics used
for identifying the bad data entries, one intuitive heuristic to get the target meters
removed is to make the mean energy of the normalized residues at the target meters
as large as possible. Making the target meters have large normalized residues in
the first iteration is of course not a guarantee of their removal in the following
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iterations. Nevertheless, this is a reasonable heuristic to avoid the difficult task of












(ΩWa)2i + C, (4.16)
where C is the number of the meters in IT that do not form a single-element critical




(ΩWa)2i = ‖STΩWa‖22 where ST ∈ R|IT|×m is
the row-selection matrix which retains only the rows corresponding to the target
meters.
4.4.2 Optimal Framing Attack via QCQP
The ultimate objective of the framing attack is to gain an ability to perturb the
state estimate by an arbitrary degree. To this end, the framing attack aims to
accomplish two tasks.
The first is to make the bad data processing remove the target meters such
that the network with the remaining meters becomes vulnerable to a covert state
attack by the adversary. As discussed in Section 4.4.1, we attempt to achieve this
goal by maximizing the mean energy of the normalized target residues, which is
equivalent to maximizing ‖STΩWa‖22.
The second task is to ensure that the attack becomes covert after the target
meters are removed, thereby making arbitrary state perturbation possible. Let
H0 denote the m × n measurement matrix obtained from H by replacing the
rows corresponding to the target meters with zero row vectors. Then, the attack
becomes covert (i.e., the attack vector lies in the column space of the measurement
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matrix) after the target meters are removed, if and ony if a is in R(H0). Therefore,
we restrict the attack vector a to be not only in the feasible set A but also in R(H0).
Based on the aforementioned intuition, we solve the following optimization to
find the optimal direction to align the attack vector:
maxa ‖STΩWa‖22
subj. ‖a‖22 = 1, a ∈ R(H0) ∩A.
(4.17)
The optimization (4.17) gives the optimal direction a∗ of the attack vector to
maximize the mean energy of the normalized target residues, among the feasible
directions that render the attack covert after the target meters are removed.
To provide a more intuitive description of the feasible set in (4.17), we in-
troduce the (m − |IA| − |IT|) × n matrix H¯ obtained from H by removing the
rows corresponding to the adversary and target meters. It can be easily seen that
a ∈ R(H0)∩A if and only if a = H0x0 for some x0 ∈ N(H¯). Therefore, the dimen-
sion of R(H0) ∩A is equal to the dimension of N(H¯). For instance, if IA ∪ IT is a
critical set, H¯ has rank n− 1, and its null space has dimension one. Therefore, in
this case, R(H0)∩A is a one-dimensional space, and there is no need to search for
the optimal direction. On the other hand, if IA ∪ IT contains more than one crit-
ical sets, the dimension of N(H¯) is greater than one, and the optimization (4.17)
searches for the optimal direction among the infinite set of feasible directions.
Finally, we set an attack vector a as ηa∗ where η ∈ R is a parameter that
adjusts the direction (i.e., positive or negative depending on the sign of η) and
the magnitude of the resulting state perturbation. It is important to point out
that a sufficiently large |η| is necessary for successful removal of the target meters.
Because, the mean of the J(xˆ)-test statistic (of Bad Data Detection) increases
linearly with respect to |η|2 [40], and we want the test statistic to be larger than the
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threshold in multiple iterations such that Bad Data Identification can be invoked
enough times to remove all the target meters.
In practice, real-world power meters have very high signal-to-noise ratios
(SNRs) [76], which means that even a small attack vector can be detected by
the J(xˆ)-test. Therefore, the necessary size of |η| to invoke Bad Data Identifi-
cation in multiple iterations is expected to be reasonably small. The numerical
examples in Section 4.6 demonstrate that the framing attack that perturbs the
measurement vector by less than 1% in L1-norm can succeed under a moderately
high SNR setting.
The optimization (4.17) can be written as a QCQP:
minq q
TPq
subj. qTQq− 1 = 0, q ∈ Rp,
(4.18)
where
P , −(STΩWB)T (STΩWB), Q , BTB, (4.19)
and B ∈ Rm×p is the basis matrix of the p-dimensional vector space R(H0) ∩ A.
Note that the dimension p is nonzero because the target meters are set such that
a covert attack becomes feasible after their removal. In addition, P is negative
semidefinite, and Q is positive definite since B has full column rank. The posi-
tive definiteness of Q implies that a solution exists (i.e., the objective function is
bounded below.)
The KKT conditions for (4.18) are as follows:
Pq+ λ(Qq) = 0, qTQq− 1 = 0, (4.20)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier for the equality constraint. The optimal solution
q∗ of (4.18) is the one that results in the minimum objective function value among
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all (λ,q) pairs satisfying the KKT conditions (4.20).
The KKT conditions (4.20) imply that
Q−1Pq = λq;
qTPq = qT (−λQq) = −λqTQq = −λ.
(4.21)
For any solution (λ,q) of (4.20), the first equation means that λ should be an
eigenvalue of Q−1P, and q should be in the corresponding eigenspace. The second
equation means that the objective function value at q is equal to −λ. Therefore,
we can find an optimal solution q∗ of (4.18) as follows: (i) find the maximum
eigenvalue of Q−1P, and (ii) find an eigenvector q∗ in the corresponding eigenspace
that satisfies (q∗)TQq∗ − 1 = 0. Once q∗ is found, an optimal solution a∗ of the
original problem (4.17) is constructed as a∗ = Bq∗.
4.5 Factor-of-Two Result
In this section, we demonstrate that the framing attack enables the adversary
controlling only a half of a critical set of meters to perturb the state estimate by
an arbitrary degree. Specifically, given a partition {I1, I2} of a critical set of meters,
we present a sufficient condition under which the adversary can control one of I1
or I2 to perturb the state estimate by an arbitrary degree. We provide numerical
evidences from IEEE benchmark networks that for the critical sets associated with
cuts, we can find a partition with |I1| ≃ |I2| satisfying the sufficient condition.
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4.5.1 Estimation of Adversarial State Estimate Perturba-
tion
The exact analysis of how the framing attack would perturb the state estimate at
the end of the iterative bad data processing is a difficult task. However, assuming
that the meter SNRs are high, we can estimate the effect of the framing attack as
follows. Since SNRs of most practical meters tend to be higher than 46 dB [76],
the high meter SNR assumption is reasonable.
Suppose that the attacker adds the attack vector a to z, and the bad data test
is executed on z¯. The measurement vector in the kth iteration is
z¯(k) = H(k)x+ a(k) + e(k), (4.22)
where H(k), a(k) and e(k) are obtained from H, a and e by removing the (k − 1)
rows corresponding to the meters identified as bad until the (k − 1)st iteration.
The state estimate xˆ(k) is
[(H(k))T (Σ(k))−1H(k)]−1(H(k))T (Σ(k))−1z¯(k)
= x+ [(H(k))T (Σ(k))−1H(k)]−1(H(k))T (Σ(k))−1(a(k) + e(k)).
(4.23)
Hence, the state estimate perturbation after the kth iteration is
xˆ(k) − x = [(H(k))T (Σ(k))−1H(k)]−1(H(k))T (Σ(k))−1(a(k) + e(k)). (4.24)
In addition, the residue vector is
r(k) =W(k)z¯(k) =W(k)(H(k)x+ a(k) + e(k))
=W(k)(a(k) + e(k)).
(4.25)
From (4.24) and (4.25), we can see that both the state estimate perturbation and
the residue vector do not depend on the actual state x. Considering that bad
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data detection and identification at each iteration exclusively rely on the residue
vector, the observation from (4.24) and (4.25) implies that if we are interested in
analyzing how much the attack perturbs the final state estimate, i.e., xˆ(N) − x,
where N denotes the total number of iterations, we can simply work with a+e by
assuming that x is equal to 0.
Furthermore, if the meter SNRs are significantly large (i.e., σ2 ≪ 1), we can
estimate the resulting state perturbation by running the noiseless version of the
bad data processing on the attack vector a and checking the resulting xˆ(N). The
noiseless version means the algorithm which the bad data processing converges to
as σ2 decays to 0. Specifically, Σ is replaced3 by Σ¯, and in the kth iteration, the
detector declares presence of bad data if and only if (r(k))T (Σ¯(k))−1r(k) > 0 (i.e.,
the data are declared to be good if and only if the state estimation results in a
zero residue vector.)
4.5.2 Factor-of-Two Theorem for Critical Sets
Suppose that {I1, I2} is a partition of a critical set, and let H¯ denote the measure-
ment matrix after removing the meters in I1 ∪ I2 from the grid. Since I1 ∪ I2 is
a critical set, H¯ has rank n − 1, and the dimension of its null space is one. Let
∆x denote a unit basis vector of the null space of H¯. Recalling the discussion in
Section 4.4.2, if I1 is the set of adversary meters, and I2 is the target set, then the
framing attack aligns the attack vector along H1∆x, where H1 is the m×n matrix
obtained from H by replacing the rows corresponding to the meters in I2 with zero
3Note that State Estimation and Bad Data Identification are not affected by the value of σ2.
Because, σ2 gets cancelled out in the state estimate expression (4.12), and Bad Data Identification
depends on the relative magnitudes of each residue with respect to other residues, which are not
affected by the value of σ2. Only Bad Data Detection is affected by the decaying σ2.
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row vectors (H2 is defined in the same way by replacing the rows corresponding
to I1.)
The following theorem provides a sufficient condition that guarantees that the
framing attack can use one of I1 and I2 to perturb the state estimate by an arbitrary
degree under the high SNR setting. The condition is based on the result of running
the deterministic test described in Section 4.5.1.
Theorem 4.5.1 Suppose that if we run the noiseless version of the state estima-
tion and the bad data processing on H1∆x, then there exists a unique state y ∈ Rn
such that the final state estimate is always equal to y (i.e., xˆ(N) = y) regardless
of whatever decisions are made under tie4 situations in Bad Data Identification.
Under this condition, the following hold for any true state x ∈ Rn:
(1) Suppose y 6= 0. If the framing attack using I1 as adversary meters and I2




Pr(z¯(N) = H(N)(x+ ηy) + e(N)) = 1, (4.26)
where N is the random variable representing the total number of iterations in the
bad data processing.
(2) Suppose y 6= ∆x. If the framing attack using I2 as adversary meters and
I1 as target meters (i.e., a = ηH2∆x) is launched, then
lim
σ2→0
Pr(z¯(N) = H(N)(x+ η(∆x− y)) + e(N)) = 1. (4.27)
4It is possible that a tie may occur in Bad Data Identification at some iteration: i.e., the
largest absolute normalized residue is assumed by more than one meter. In a tie situation,
we assume that Bad Data Identification chooses an arbitrary meter with the largest absolute
normalized residue.
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Proof: See Section 4.7
The event {z¯(N) = H(N)(x + ηy) + e(N)} means that the final measurement
vector at the end of the bad data processing is a noisy measurement vector with
the state perturbed by ηy. Theorem 4.5.1 implies that if the condition is met,
then at least one of I1 and I2 can be used by the framing attack to perturb the
state estimate by an arbitrary degree, because y cannot be simultaneously 0 and
∆x. Especially, if the condition holds for the partition with |I1| = |I2|, then the
adversary controlling only a half of the critical set can perturb the state estimate
by an arbitrary degree.
One important question is whether a partition {I1, I2} with |I1| ≃ |I2| that
satisfies the condition of Theorem 4.5.1 can be found in general. To answer this
question, we investigated critical sets associated with cuts5 in the IEEE 14-bus
and 118-bus networks, where every bus has an injection meter and every line has
line meters for both directions. The spanning tree observability criterion in [26]
implies that the set I of the meters associated with a cut (i.e., the set of the line
meters on the cut-set lines and the injection meters on the both ends of the cut-set
lines) forms a critical set if removing the cutset decomposes the topology into two
connected graphs. For instance, the cut in Fig. 4.2 disconnects the bus 3 from the
rest of the network, and {{2, 3}, {3, 4}} is the associated cut-set. The set of circled
red meters is the critical set associated with the cut.
We executed 20,000 runs of the random contraction algorithm by Karger and
Stein [77]—a randomized algorithm for finding a cut—and found 118 cuts in the
14-bus network and 290 cuts in the 118-bus network. For each cut, we built a
5A cut of an undirected graph (V,E) is defined as a partition {V1,V2} of V consisting of two
nonempty subsets, and the associated cut-set is the subset of lines connecting two vertices in
different partitions.
114
Figure 4.2: IEEE 14-bus network: the rectangles on lines and buses represent
line flow meters and bus injection meters respectively. The line meter on the line
{i, j}, that is closer to i, measures the power flow from i to j. The red dashed line
describes a cut, and the circled meters are the meters associated with the cut.
partition {I1, I2} of the critical set I associated with the cut such that |I1| ≃ |I|2 : I1
consists of only the line meters (both directions) associated with a subset of lines in
the cut-set such that
∣∣∣|I1| − |I|2 ∣∣∣ ≤ 1, and I2 is set to be I\I1. In both networks, for
every cut we considered, the partition constructed in the aforementioned manner
satisfied the condition of Theorem 4.5.1; this suggests that the sufficient condition
is not stringent, at least for critical sets associated with cuts6.




We tested the performance of the framing attack with the IEEE 14-bus and 118-
bus networks under both the DC and AC models. The AC simulation results
demonstrate the efficacy of the framing attack under the real-world power system
setting. Because the ultimate goal of the attack is to perturb the state estimate,
we measure the mean L2-norm of the resulting state estimate error:
E[‖xˆ− x‖2],
where xˆ is the state estimate, and x is the true state.
4.6.1 Simulation Setting
In the IEEE 14-bus and 118-bus networks, we chose representative attack scenar-
ios (i.e., adversary meters and target meters) and tested the performance of the
framing attack. For each case, we ran Monte Carlo simulations to evaluate the
mean state estimate perturbation. In each Monte Carlo run, the true state x was
generated by a multivariate Gaussian distribution with small variances. Its mean
was set as the operating state given by the IEEE 14-bus and 118-bus data [78].
Based on the generated state x, the noisy measurements were generated by the
measurement model (i.e., h(x) + e). The attack vector was constructed based on
the DC measurement matrix H as described in Section 4.4. Once constructed, the
atack vector was added to the noisy measurements, and state estimation and bad
data processing7 were executed on the corrupted measurements. After the bad
data processing finished, we measured ‖xˆ(N) − x‖2.
7The false alarm rate of the bad data detector is set to be 0.04 throughout all the simulations.
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The main difference between the DC and AC simulations is that we used differ-
ent measurement models for data generation. Note that the design of the framing
attack was studied for the DC model which has only the real part of the mea-
surements. For the AC simulations, we designed the attack vector based on the
DC model, and the attack modified only the corresponding real part of the mea-
surements. Considering the linear decoupled model (see Chapter 2.7 in [51]), such
addition of the attack vector is expected to modify primarily the bus voltage phase
angles and have little effect on the bus voltage magnitudes. Hence, in interpreting
the AC results, we focus on the perturbation in the phase-angle part of the state
estimate.
For comparison, we also executed the conservative scheme in [24], which aims
to perturb the state estimate by the maximum degree while not raising any alarm
in the bad data processing. This scheme has been considered as the best the
adversary incapable of a covert state attack can do. In the conservative scheme,
the attack vector was designed as a solution to
maxa∈A ‖(HTΣ−1H)−1HTΣ−1a‖22
subj. rTΣ−1r ≤ τ,
(4.28)
where the constraint guarantees that the alarm is not raised at all, and the objective
function is the resulting perturbation of the state estimate due to the attack vector.
4.6.2 Simulation Results with 14-Bus Network
We first tested the case where the adversary can control only a half of a critical set.
Specifically, we considered the adversary who can control (2, 3), (3, 4), and (4, 3):
(i, j) denotes the line meter for the power flow from i to j, and (i) denotes the
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injection meter at bus i. The target meters were set to be (3, 2), (2), (3), and (4)
such that the set of adversary meters and target meters is the critical set associated
with the cut in Fig. 4.2. We tested the framing attack with three different attack
magnitudes: ‖a‖1 is 1%, 2%, or 3% of ‖z‖1.
Fig. 4.3 shows the resulting state estimate perturbations versus the meter SNR
in the DC simulations. The meter SNR ranges from 26 dB to 46 dB (equivalently,
the noise-to-signal amplitude ratio ranges from 5% to 0.5%.) Note that the SNR
range we tested is no greater than the SNR of most practical meters deployed
in real-world power networks [76]. The normal state estimate error and the state
estimate error under the conservative scheme are very close, and both decay to zero
as the SNR increases. However, the state estimate error under the framing attack
converges to a constant, which is proportional to the attack magnitude, as the SNR
increases. The result implies that the framing attack can adjust the state estimate
perturbation by choosing a proper attack magnitude. The effect of the framing
attack becomes distinct from the normal state estimate error when the SNR is
high. To demonstrate the relative effect of the framing attack with respect to the
normal error, Fig. 4.4 shows the resulting state estimate perturbation normalized
with respect to the state estimate error under the non-attack scenario. Under
the same attack setting, Fig. 4.5 shows the state estimate perturbation versus the
meter SNR in the AC simulations. It can be observed that, especially in the high
SNR region, the perturbation amount is proportional to the attack magnitude.
The plots imply that the effect of the framing attack persists in the AC model,
thereby suggesting that the framing attack can be detrimental to the real-world
power system state estimation.
Second, we demonstrate that the framing attack may pursue perturbation in
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Figure 4.3: DC simulations with the 14-bus network: 1,000 Monte Carlo runs. The
adversary meters are (2, 3), (3, 4), and (4, 3), and the target meters are (3, 2), (2),
(3), and (4).































Figure 4.4: DC simulations with the 14-bus network: 1,000 Monte Carlo runs. The
adversary meters are (2, 3), (3, 4), and (4, 3), and the target meters are (3, 2), (2),
(3), and (4).
various directions by choosing a different target set. We considered the case that
the adversary controls (2, 3), (3, 4), (4, 3), (6, 12), (12, 6), and (12, 13). Note that
the adversary still cannot control any critical set, and thus a covert attack is in-
feasible. The framing attack with any of the following three different target sets
successfully perturbed the state estimate: (i) (2), (3), (4), (3, 2), (6), (12), (13),
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Figure 4.5: AC simulations with the 14-bus network: 1,000 Monte Carlo runs.
The adversary meters are (2, 3), (3, 4), and (4, 3), and the target meters are 2, 3,
4, (3, 2).
and (13, 12); (ii) (2), (3), (4), and (3, 2); (iii) (6), (12), (13), and (13, 12). For in-
stance, Fig. 4.6 shows the state estimate perturbation versus the meter SNR in the
AC simulations for the first target set. While the three target sets all resulted in
successful state estimate perturbation, each resulted in a different direction of per-
turbation. For each target set, Table 4.2 shows the three buses, whose phase angle
estimates were most significantly perturbed, and the mean perturbation of their
phase angle estimates; positive perturbation means overestimation, and negative
perturbation means underestimation. The table demonstrates that the adversary
controlling a large number of meters may adjust the direction of perturbation by
choosing a proper target set. Note that with the second target set, whose asso-
ciated critical set (i.e., the critical set contained in IA ∪ IT) isolates bus 3, the
framing attack perturbed the bus-3 phase angle estimate significantly while hav-
ing little effect on other bus phase angle estimates. This is expected because once
the target meters are successfully removed from the network, the adversary can
control all the real meter measurements that depend on the bus-3 phase angle.
The similar effect can be observed for the framing attack with the third target
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Figure 4.6: AC simulations with the 14-bus network: 1,000 Monte Carlo runs.
The adversary meters are (2, 3), (3, 4), (4, 3), (6, 12), (12, 6), and (12, 13), and the
target meters are 2, 3, 4, (3, 2), 6, 12, 13, and (13, 12).
Table 4.2: The three buses whose phase angles are most significantly perturbed by
each attack: AC simulations, 1,000 Monte Carlo runs, SNR = 46dB.
(2), (3), (4), (3, 2),





1) bus 12: 2.075◦
2) bus 3: 0.272◦
3) bus 14: −0.180◦
1) bus 3: −2.183◦
2) bus 14: 0.182◦
3) bus 9: 0.168◦
1) bus 12: 2.878◦
2) bus 14: 0.005◦
3) bus 9: 0.004◦
set, whose associated cut isolates bus 12. On the other hand, for the first target
set, once the target meters are removed, the adversary controls all the real meter
measurements that depend on the bus-3 phase angle or the bus-12 phase angle.
In this case, the framing attack, constructed by the QCQP framework in (4.17),
perturbed both bus-3 and bus-12 phase angle estimates.
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Figure 4.7: AC simulations with the 118-bus network: 250 Monte Carlo runs. The
adversary meters are (20, 21), (21, 20), and (21, 22), and the target meters are (20),
(21), (22), and (22, 21).
4.6.3 Simulation Results with 118-Bus Network
Through the simulations with the 118-bus network, we aim to demonstrate the
effect of the framing attack on a larger network. We considered the scenario where
the adversary controls (20, 21), (21, 20), and (21, 22), and the target meters are
(20), (21), (22), and (22, 21); i.e., the set of the adversary meters and the target
meters is the critical set associated with the cut isolating the bus 21 from the rest of
the network. Fig. 4.7 shows the state estimate errors under the non-attack scenario
and the framing attacks with different attack magnitudes in the AC simulations.
The plots imply that the framing attack successfully perturbs the state estimate,
and thus its adversarial effect persists in a larger network.
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4.7 Proof of Theorem 4.5.1
Let S denote the set of sequences of meter removals that can possibly happen
when the noiseless version of bad data processing is executed on H1∆x: i.e.,
(a1, . . . , aM) ∈ S if and only if some decisions under tie situations may result in
the removal of the meters {a1, . . . , aM} in the order of a1, . . . , aM . The cardinality
of S can be greater than 1 since different decisions under tie situations may result
in different sequences of meter removals.
For any sequence (a1, . . . , aM) ∈ S, the existence of such y—as described in the
condition—implies that if all the meters in the sequence are removed, the remaining
part of H1∆x, denoted by H
(M)





obtained from H1 and H respectively, by removing the rows corresponding to all
meters in the sequence.
Now, consider running the bad data test onHx+H1∆x+e. The equation (4.25)
implies that the residue vector in each iteration only depends on H1∆x + e. In
addition, as σ2 decreases to zero, the results of bad data detection and identification
heavily depend onH1∆x, and thus the sequence of removed meters becomes highly
likely to be in S. Formally,
lim
σ2→0
Pr((a1, . . . , aN) ∈ S) = 1, (4.29)
where (a1, . . . , aN) is a random sequence of meters removed by the bad data test.
Let H(N) and e(N) denote the random matrix and vector obtained from H and e
respectively by removing the rows corresponding to {a1, . . . , aN}.
The event {(a1, . . . , aN) ∈ S} implies that H(N)1 ∆x = H(N)y, and thus
z¯(N) = (H(N)x+ e(N)) +H
(N)
1 ∆x = (H





Pr(z¯(N) = (H(N)x+ e(N)) +H(N)y) = 1. (4.31)




Pr(z¯(N) = (H(N)x+ e(N)) +H(N)ηy) = 1. (4.32)
Now, consider running the bad data test over Hx+H2∆x+ e; this is the case
when the framing attack is launched with the partition I2. First, note that
H∆x = H1∆x+H2∆x. (4.33)
Therefore, running the bad data test on Hx+H2∆x+ e is equivalent to running
it on H(x+∆x)−H1∆x+ e.
Suppose we run the noiseless version of the bad data processing on −H1∆x.
The set of sequences of meter removals that can possibly happen is equivalent to
S, because the sign change only flips the signs of residue entries; it does not affect
their absolute values, which are the statistics used for detection and identification
of bad data entries. Furthermore, it can be easily seen that the final state estimate
is always equal to −y regardless of whatever decisions are made under the tie
situations.
Now, consider again running the bad data test on H(x + ∆x) − H1∆x + e,
which is equivalent to Hx+H2∆x+ e. In exactly the same manner as we derived
(4.31), we can derive the following:
lim
σ2→0




Pr(z¯(N) = H(N)x+ e(N) +H(N)(∆x− y)) = 1. (4.35)
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When the attack vector H2∆x is scaled by η (i.e., a = H2η∆x), repeating the
same steps as above, we can easily derive the following:
lim
σ2→0
Pr(z¯(N) = H(N)x+ e(N) +H(N)η(∆x− y)) = 1. (4.36)




In this dissertation, we studied attacks and countermeasures in communica-
tions and power networks. Specifically, stepping-stone attacks in communications
networks and data attacks in power networks were considered.
Although the attack framework varied significantly depending on the network
type and the adversary’s goal, there were some common observations. In partic-
ular, it was commonly observed in all attack problems that an adversary having
enough control on network operations can achieve its goal while hiding its presence.
Therefore, a challenging task for a network administrator is to find an affordable
protection strategy that can prevent such undetectable attacks. The main contri-
bution of dissertation was to provide conditions on the adversary’s ability under
which attacks can be detected, build network protection strategies based on the
detectability condition, and study what attacks can achieve if a network is not
secured properly.
In the following sections, we provide concluding remarks for each topic and
comments for future works.
5.1 Detection of Information Flows
In Chapter 2, we have studied timing-based detection of information flows in a
network. We formulate flow detection as a binary composite hypothesis testing
problem and present a detector that requires neither a parametric model nor a
training data set. The detector requires a constant memory, and it has linear
computational complexity with respect to the sample size. The simulations with
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real-world TCP and VoIP traces demonstrate that the proposed detector is superior
to the benchmark passive detectors and more suitable for the nonparametric and
unsupervised setting.
The test results with the real-world traces suggest that the proposed detector
may perform well in a more practical setting. Nevertheless, as all other passive
detectors, our detector has a fundamental limit that it cannot detect the flow if the
presence of the flow generates no correlation between the timing measurements at
all.
5.2 Topology Attack of a Power Grid
In Chapter 3, we have considered undetectable malicious data attack aimed at
creating a false topology at the control center. We obtain a necessary and sufficient
condition for an attack launched by a strong attacker to be undetectable. We also
present a class of undetectable line removal attacks that can be launched by weak
attackers with only local information. Finally, we present a countermeasure against
strong attackers by protecting a subset of meters.
Some of the results presented in Chapter 3 are obtained under strong conditions.
Here, we mention several of such limitations as pointers for further study. First, the
DC model assumed in Section 3.3 makes the results valid only near the operating
point. It has been demonstrated in [39] that the DC model tends to exaggerate
the effect of state attacks, and the nonlinear state estimator has the ability to
significantly reduce the attacks’ impact on the state estimate. Obtaining conditions
for undetectable topology attacks under the AC model is of considerable interest.
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Second, we have focused mostly on state-preserving topology attacks. Even
though such attacks are optimal under certain scenarios, to understand the full
implication of topology attacks, it is necessary to consider attacks that affect both
topology and states.
Finally, we consider only one particular form of countermeasure, namely im-
plementing authentication at a subset of meters. Other mechanisms should be
studied, including one with more sophisticated bad data detection and those tak-
ing into accounts of system dynamics.
5.3 Data Framing Attack on State Estimation
In Chapter 4, we have presented the data framing attack on power system state
estimation. Controlling only a half of a critical set, the data framing attack can
perturb the state estimate by an arbitrary degree. A theoretical justification was
provided, and numerical experiments demonstrated the efficacy of the framing
attack.
Our results indicate that most known countermeasures, that are aimed at
merely preventing covert state attacks, are not sufficient for protection against the
attacks aimed at state perturbation. In designing countermeasures, the possibility
of the framing attack needs to be taken into account.
One important direction for future work is to find an easily verifiable necessary
condition for the framing attack to succeed with given adversary meters. Such a
condition is essential for designing a countermeasure.
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